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ABSTRACT 
A two-state solution between Israel and Palestine requires guaranteed security 
for both nations, as well as commitments from surrounding nations and a 
cooperation of effort to prevent radical elements within society from disrupting 
what the majority desire, peace. This thesis will attempt to review the security 
conditions, as spelled out in the Oslo peace process, and concludes that the 
greatest failure was the approach.  Oslo attempted to build up to a final solution 
through “confidence-building measures.”  Because the final status was nebulous, 
both sides postured and set polices that worked against a two-state solution.  
Had the borders been set and agreed to from the start, the “confidence-building 
measures” would have worked in favor of a two-state solution instead of 
against it.  
To prove the necessity of setting a border first, this thesis, through the use 
of geographic threat considerations, will conduct an Intelligence Preparation of 
the Battlespace (IPB) analysis. An IPB is an intelligence tool used to figure out 
the strengths and weaknesses of any campaign. This thesis hopes to show that 
setting a border first, and then working backwards through the “confidence-
building measures,” will lead to a greater chance for peace.  
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I. TWO-STATE SOLUTION 
What are the security requirements for a two-state solution between Israel 
and Palestine? 
A two-state solution between Israel and Palestine has long been the 
dream for providing stability in the region. What are the security requirements 
needed for a successful realization of this objective? Security is more than a 
police force guaranteeing the rule-of-law or a military to protect the borders. It 
involves every aspect of life. To understand what a peaceful two-state solution 
would look like, it is necessary to conduct a comprehensive study examining 
various segments for each nation as it relates to security. For example, 
geographically depicting each nation’s force structure will reveal their security 
priorities, while mapping economic concentrations will reveal where security is 
needed for economic stability. Understanding the structures, strengths, 
weaknesses, and agendas of the two parties and their security forces will give 
greater insight into where the friction points are that prevent a peaceful two-state 
solution from becoming established.   
An in-depth analysis of the security sector will confirm the need for a 
comprehensive approach to solving the peace process and will ensure a greater 
likelihood of survival over time. The amount of literature on the Israeli-Palestinian 
security issue is immense.  Much of the literature either is one-sided and 
attempts to justify the actions of one side over the other, or it tries to capture the 
facts of the events as they happened.  What I hope to add to the literature is to 
identify with greater clarity what is preventing a peaceful resolution and to offer 
ideas on how to move the peace process forward, using a pragmatic analysis of 
the material and a military method known as Intelligence Preparation of the 
Battlespace, or IPB.   Peace between Israel and Palestine in a two-state solution 
would rest in the hands of the more powerful member, in this case Israel. Israel 
holds all the advantages of a professional, well-equipped, modern military that 
dominates all warfare areas: land, sea, and air.  It is preoccupied with short-term 
 2
security at all costs and fails to recognize opportunities that would lead to long-
term stability and peace. Palestine, for its part, must transition from an identity 
based on a revolutionary movement to a national identity, one that holds to an 
open, freely elected government that keeps the rights of its citizens as its primary 
purpose.  For there to be security for Israel and development for Palestine, both 
must compromise.  The Oslo peace process attempted to bridge the divide and 
was very successful in many aspects but failed by not establishing the borders 
first. 
If Oslo at the start, had established clear borders showing the final shape 
of both countries after the completed process, then both nations would have 
been working in concert toward the same goal.  Instead, with the borders 
undefined, both sides used confidence-building measures as means to 
manipulate the process and establish facts on the ground, so that when it came 
time for the final status talks, they would have an advantage in the negotiations.  
Israel did this by building more settlements and infrastructure to support the 
settlements while cutting off Palestinian villages and population from the rest of 
the West Bank.  Palestine attempted to build its security forces in a way that 
would allow it to hold on to its revolutionary identity and remain loyal to 
personalities within the leadership, while under the guise of nation building.  
Israel feared the Palestinian forces were being turned into a quasi army, and as 
proof, it points to conflicts that erupted between Israel and Palestinian forces in 
2000 at the collapse of the Oslo process 
Where Oslo succeeded was in showing that there is room for compromise, 
and that when an agreement is finally reached on establishing the borders, the 
mechanisms can be recreated to allow for a peaceful transition to Palestinian 
autonomy.  By agreeing to set borders, the issue of Israeli settlements will 
disappear because they will either be incorporated into Israeli territory and no 
longer be an administrative concern for Palestine, or they will be given to 
Palestine for control.  The refugee right of return will also disappear, as there will 
be a Palestinian state established to incorporate the refugees back into 
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Palestinian society.  This is obviously easier said than done. Establishing the 
borders first through land swaps will allow these necessary compromises to 
become part of the equation and allow the peace process to get back on track.   
It is in the interest of the United States to resolve this problem peaceably 
sooner rather than later.  Attempting to achieve American interest elsewhere in 
the Middle East has been hindered because of this problem. Men and women in 
the armed forces, as well as at the embassies, put their lives on the line each 
and every day as long as this issue goes unresolved.  Solving this issue will not 
solve all the issues in the Middle East, but it certainly can help in curtailing 
Iranian foreign policy and building confidence in Middle Eastern countries that the 
United States is an honest broker of peace. In addition, a resolution could assist 
with curtailing radical Islam and the spread of terrorism.  One of radical Islam’s 
calls for action is against the injustice against the Palestinians, but if the issue is 
resolved, then radical Islam begins to lose a rallying cry that is a common cause 
across all levels of society.  
Israel has set a policy of Security First for its negotiations, and they 
believe that they must maintain superiority in order to maintain security—at the 
cost of Palestinian autonomy.  However, “security is not just an Israeli concern. 
Palestinians must believe that they will have a sovereign, contiguous, and 
economically viable state that will be free from continued Israeli controls and 
forcible interventions.”1 Only when Palestine is an equal in providing security for 
its citizens and its neighbors, as well as a developed economy that provides 
hope for a future to its citizens, will peace be viable. Palestinians must have hope 
in a better future for themselves and their children for them to trust in any 
agreements made with Israel.  If Palestinians believe they will have a greater 
future with peace, rather than a life of uncertainty and poverty, then the 
Palestinian population will demand peace and protect it from the radical elements 
from within its own society. By defining a clear border, the Palestinians will be 
                                            
1  J. D. Crouch II et al., Security First: U.S. Priorities in Israeli-Palestinian Peacemaking 
(Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2008).  
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able to understand and identify with the shape and territory that will be theirs at 
the end of the process.  Understanding what Palestine will look like, and what 
areas Palestine will be responsible for, will give the Palestinian population the 
hope needed to push the Palestinian Authority towards peace while 
simultaneously creating a new national identity based on nationalism instead of 
revolution.  
The IPB analysis will show that the security threat comes from outside 
forces equipping Palestinians with advanced weapons and rockets.  This threat 
will greatly increase if the two-state solution is not handled correctly.  This thesis 
will conclude that as part of the overall security situation, Palestine will require 
greater autonomy and an ability to develop its economy in relation to the world 
market. Limitations on Palestinian borders must simultaneously meet Israeli 
security needs while supporting Palestinian growth.  These limitations should not 
be through Israeli military control. Instead, a third nation that holds the interest of 
maintaining security should provide security along any Palestinian border that is 
not connected to Israel.  This third nation security force should only control the 
borders and provide oversight for the transit of goods and services. It should not 
be the provider of security within Palestine.  Any security force attempting to 
provide security in Palestine will be seen as an occupying force and come to 
symbolize any failings by the Palestinian government. 
Another key conclusion this thesis supports is the separation of 
economies.  While growing economies lead towards peace and stability, the 
economy can only be supported in a secure environment that is established 
through the identifying of clear borders. The Israeli economy is more efficient; 
more technologically advanced, and far out produces its Palestinian counterpart.  
The Palestinian economy is labor intensive, agriculturally based, and has a large 
public sector with very little private investment.  Currently, the greatest 
connection between the two is Palestine providing cheap labor to Israeli 
enterprises.  Palestine is unable to compete in this environment and must be 
given the chance to build its own infrastructure and institutions.  A simple 
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comparison between GDP per capita proves the imbalance. Israeli GDP per 
capita in 2010 was $28,393, and Palestinian GDP per capita in 2008, the last 
year the GDP per capita in Palestine was collected, was $2,900.2,3 For lasting 
peace to solidify, the two nations must work together economically.  This will only 
come once Palestine is allowed to develop to a level that will allow it to build 
multinational corporations and participate in regional trade organizations.  These 
types of institutions have the ability to tie the two nations economically together, 
forcing them to work together on security-related issues.  
Water is a precious resource in the Middle East and, in many ways, more 
valuable then oil.  Israeli and Palestinian water supplies are connected and, 
however the borders are shaped, this fact will always remain true.  While this 
thesis concludes that the economies should be divided for a period of time, the 
water infrastructure, management, and oversight should be connected. Water 
drives the economy, and if mismanaged or polluted by one partner, the other is 
affected.  Neither should one partner be given complete authority over the 
resources, potentially creating an imbalance in distribution.  A joint approach to 
this problem would ensure the prevention of over pumping, provide the best 
quality of product to both peoples and help grow the economy.  In addition, by 
being connected through this public utility, when the Palestinian economy is more 
fully developed at a later time, a reintegration through multinational corporations 
and regional trade agreements can better facilitate linking the two nations 
through peaceful means.  
A two-state solution is achievable by defining the borders, with follow-on 
negotiations over the less contentious issues, while direct oversight of 
measurable benchmarks is monitored by the United States.  The United States 
must be able to provide real incentives and penalties to facilitate the peace 
process while maintaining security for both Israel and Palestine. 
                                            
2  The Heritage Foundation, “2011 Index of Economic Freedom: Israel,” The Heritage 
Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/Index/country/Israel. 
3  CIA, “The World Factbook: West Bank,” https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/we.html.  
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Looking to the future at the desired end state of a two-state solution is 
confusing and complicated.  Using a point-in-time to establish perspective, there 
are two methods of looking toward the end state. Method one uses the starting 
point of now and looks forward.  Attempting to predict pitfalls, violent reaction, 
and needed policy changes is difficult when the desired end state is a nebulous 
concept of a peaceful two-state solution.  There are a lot of unanswered 
questions as to what that two-state solution will look like, and trying to adjust as 
the process moves forward keeps all interested parties attempting to keep the 
balance of a peaceful resolution viable.  The second method uses the end point 
as the starting point and looks backwards towards now. The problem with this 
approach is that it uses a lot of assumptions. However, by identifying a clear end 
state, all interested parties are on an equal playing field, and there is no question 
about different parties achieving different objectives than what is stated. By 
starting at the end point and looking back, we are more likely to see the path 
needed to reach the desired goal.  Once that path is identified, one can then start 
to look forward from our perspective of today. For a visual representation of the 
two points in time perspective see Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1.   Point in Time Perspective 
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How does one identify what a two-state solution would look like?  This 
thesis proposes to use the process known as IPB.  This is a process designed to 
show a geographical point-in-time that allows one to identify strengths and 
weaknesses of the security sector. The IPB is doctrine approved by the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff in Joint Publication 2-01.3 Joint Intelligence Preparation of the 
Operational Environment (JIPOE). Not to be confused, the JIPOE is the same as 
the IPB but at the joint level. 
(JIPOE) is the analytical process used by joint intelligence 
organizations to produce intelligence assessments, estimates, and 
other intelligence products in support of the joint force 
commander’s (JFC’s) decision-making process. It is a continuous 
process that involves four major steps: defining the total operational 
environment; describing the impact of the operational environment; 
evaluating the adversary; and determining and describing 
adversary potential courses of action (COAs), particularly the 
adversary’s most likely COA and the COA most dangerous to 
friendly forces and mission accomplishment. The JIPOE process 
assists JFCs and their staffs in achieving information superiority by 
identifying adversary centers of gravity (COGs), focusing 
intelligence collection at the right time and place, and analyzing the 
impact of the operational environment on military operations.4 
The IPB will be conducted in Chapter VI, building on analysis of the issues 
surrounding negotiations, economic security, as well as analysis of the security 
institutions for both Israel and Palestine. While this thesis does not consider 
either Israel or Palestine an enemy, this method will allow analysis to be 
conducted from the perspective of both side’s point of view on what each nation’s 
strengths and weaknesses are as well as needs. The weakness of the IPB 
process is that, while it is a technical analysis of the physical environment, it is 
not able to account for the human element such as political policy, perceptions, 
and desire. To account for these missing elements, Chapters II through V will 
attempt to identify critical policies, intentions, and capabilities as they relate to 
security needs. Armed with this understanding, it will provide a complete picture 
                                            
4  Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment 
(Washington D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense,2009): http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp2-01-
3.pdf. 
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of what security requirements are needed for each nation to mutually respect 
each other’s boundaries.  This method only provides a physical understanding; 
bridging the gap of trust will only come through cooperation, institution building, 
economic development, trade, and time.  
Sourcing for the IPB process will derive from the Wye River agreement, 
the United Nations, think tanks, scientific publications, the Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy, Israel’s national water company, and the Palestinian 
support unit. These sources were selected because they are the authority on 
geographical issues. Having a geographical picture of security requirements for a 
two-state solution will help with the peace process, but how that picture relates to 
current security objectives will provide the indications of potential conflict and 
potential reconciliation. 
A. IMPORTANCE 
This topic bears directly on ongoing peace negotiations between Israel 
and Palestine, as well as informing U.S. foreign policy.  Solving the conflict will 
build American credibility as an unbiased arbiter around the world and help 
alleviate pressure on American policy in the region. In testimony on March 16, 
2010, as the commander of CENTCOM before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, General Petraeus confirmed the necessity for resolving the Israeli 
Palestinian conflict peacefully.  
The enduring hostilities between Israel and some of its neighbors 
present distinct challenges to our ability to advance our interests in 
the AOR.  Israeli-Palestinian tensions often flare into violence and 
large-scale armed confrontations.  The conflict foments anti-
American sentiment, due to a perception of U.S. favoritism for 









and depth of U.S. partnerships with governments and peoples in 
the AOR and weakens the legitimacy of moderate regimes in the 
Arab world.5 
In addition, by using the second point-in-time described above and using 
the IPB process to identify policy weaknesses, this analysis may make a small 
contribution to the vital issue of security guarantees.  Countless lives can be 
spared from continued violence, and a major advance can occur in this most 
destabilizing location in the Middle East. By focusing on what the end state will 
look like as compared to the failures of the Oslo process and current conditions, 
this method of approach clarifies what actions need to be taken by all parties 
involved.  
B. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES  
There is much debate about which approach will most likely provide the 
necessary room for peace to be established and grow.  There are three main 
theories, in addition to each theory having subset views: Capitalist Peace Theory, 
Democratic Peace Theory, and Security First.  
Supporting Capitalist Peace Theory, Stephen Brooks in his book, 
Producing Security, argues that the best approach for lasting peace is through 
economic development and integration through regional trade organizations and 
multinational corporations. Russett Bruce in his book, Grasping the Democratic 
Peace, holds with the view of Democratic Peace Theory, that fewer wars are 
fought between democracies, therefore lasting peace will be reached through the 
creation and advancement of democracies that have open, free democratic 
governments, accountable to their citizens.67 Dennis Ross in his book, 
                                            
5  Senate Armed Services Committee, Statement of General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army 
Commander U.S. Central Command before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the 
Posture of U.S. Central Command  March 16, 2010, (2010): http://armed-
services.senate.gov/statemnt/2010/03%20March/Petraeus%2003-16-10.pdf. 
6  Stephen G. Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and the 
Changing Calculus of Conflict (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2005): 12–13.  
 10
The Missing Peace, explains that the Declaration of Principles achieved through 
the Oslo channel defined the peace process as Security First.8 The aim of 
achieving security by the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Gaza and Jericho gave 
room for a Palestinian Authority to create a government and a security force.  
Security First theory argues that a safe and secure environment must be created 
first to give room for governmental and economic institutions to be established to 
provide stability. This thesis, while focusing on security, does not advocate a 
Security First approach, but rather argues that security is only one piece of a 
necessary comprehensive approach.  A comprehensive approach utilizing all 
three theories of Capitalist Peace, Democratic Peace, and Security First 
simultaneously is the only way to lasting peace. Capitalist Peace, while 
attempting to broaden an economy, does not provide the security needed for that 
economy to grow.  Democratic Peace does not guarantee that peace will be 
pursued, as we saw with the 2006 elections that brought Hamas to power. 
Providing Security First does not ensure the development of a free society nor 
does it ensure the development of an economy that creates the jobs necessary 
to provide the stability needed for peace.  Uniting all three approaches in concert 
will lead to a society both in Palestine and Israel that can live in peace side by 
side.   
Capitalist Peace Theory and Democratic Peace Theory are dependent 
upon security to give room for development and reform, but lasting security can 
only be achieved through economic growth and political transparency. Under the 
Oslo agreement, the West Bank was divided up into three areas with varying 
degrees of Palestinian security under Israeli oversight. This approach was 
designed to allow Palestine greater responsibility over more heavily populated 
areas, and as Palestinian government efficiency grew, more areas were to be 
                                            
7  Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World 
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1993): 
http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/docDetail.action?docID=10031887.  
8  Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, 1st 
ed. (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004): 116. 
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handed over.9 With Israel in the position to demand concessions, the Palestinian 
Authority provided security in the West Bank while protecting Israel from 
terrorism, this confidence building measure transformed into the protection of 
Israel becoming the benchmark for the success or failure of Oslo. As a result, the 
Palestinian population increasingly viewed the Palestinian Authority as a puppet 
of Israel, and it lost credibility and the ability to represent Palestine as a whole. 
This thesis aims to show how cooperative security institutions can help 
bridge the gap and build trust; that security forces for both nations need to be 
adequately trained and equipped; and that while Israel will remain strong and 
capable of defending itself from other nations, because Palestinians will be 
working with Israel, it will not perceive Israel as a direct threat. In addition, this 
thesis aspires to identify a principle that both sides can agree on to reach the 
desired end state. By using the starting point of a definitive border for a two-state 
solution and looking back at the security failures of the Oslo process, a way 
forward can anticipate the failures of past attempts. It can be argued that the 
Oslo accords brought Israel and Palestine closer to a peaceful resolution than 
any other attempt.  The Oslo accords were comprehensive in nature and focused 
on security requirements but failed to anticipate violent reactions against the 
process. These violent reactions were major contributors to the Oslo accord’s 
ultimate failure. Identification of security friction points will help solve the 
problems the Oslo process faced, such as failures to unify Palestinian security 
forces, counterterrorism missions conflicting with the desired end state, Israeli 
settlements, status of Jerusalem, borders, advancement of Hamas and its 
integration into the political process, security cooperation and ensuring both 
sides have the same goals and objectives, and considerations of a third nation 
security force. Solutions to security failures will be offered, hopefully helping to 
put the peace process back on track and begin to build trust between Israel and 
Palestine. 
                                            
9  Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 7th ed. 
(Boston, New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2010): 445–446. 
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Finally, Chapter VI of this thesis will attempt to identify the security 
strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities, and areas for compromise by looking at a 
series of overlays from a geographical perspective in the IPB process. The areas 
this thesis proposes to examine as individual overlays on a map are: roads, 
borders, water, terrain analysis (a detailed study of the landscape as it relates to 
military technology and position), and economic resources. The IPB process is 
unclassified but the results of any IPB conducted by the United States military is 
classified.  It is classified because it shows what the military’s understanding is of 
a given situation as well as what their likely intention is to achieving their desired 
end state. In his book Beneath the Surface: Intelligence Preparation of the 
Battlespace for Counterterrorism, Major Troy Thomas explains the process an 
intelligence professional goes through when developing an IPB and provides a 
comprehensive set of asymmetric warfare examples of how IPBs are used.10 
This thesis will attempt to identify what the expectations are for each 
nation, where those interests complement a two-state solution, and where those 
interests conflict.  Simple identification of interests is not enough; understanding 
how these interests are protected, their vulnerabilities, and aspirations will lead to 
greater opportunities for compromise.  This thesis will be based on the heroic 
assumptions that sovereign authorities in Israel and Palestine will have agreed 
upon a two-state solution, both desire peace, and both can ultimately respect 
each other as neighbors if security conditions are met. Another assumption is 
that the United States will be the lead negotiator of a peaceful resolution. It is 
also assumed that a solution for peace would involve more areas than security, 
namely economic development and governmental reform.  While this thesis will 
not deal directly with these other areas, it assumes that reconciliation will only 
come through a comprehensive effort by all parties in all areas. Security is key 
for peaceful reconciliation, but it is absolutely vital for the successful creation of 
 
                                            
10  Troy Thomas, Beneath the Surface: Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace for 
Counterterrorism (Washington DC: NDIC Press, 2004), http://www.ndic.edu/press/2152.htm#. 
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institutions that will create the economic stability and political reform that is 
necessary for a Palestinian state that is peaceful with its neighbors and is 
accepted as an equal by Israel. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The following literature review pertains to a two-state solution between 
Israel and Palestine and is divided into three areas: security, economy, and 
government.  While this thesis deals with security issues, it is also important to 
understand that security impacts other areas of society and those areas in turn 
impact the nature of security. 
1. Security 
According to the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, there are three 
areas in security that must be addressed to facilitate peace: Security First, 
training and equipping, and the use of an international peacekeeping force.11 The 
Palestinian perspective of security needs is for an effective response to specific 
threats, mutual recognition of each other as nation states, and the creation of 
mechanisms for ongoing cooperation, protection of human rights, and promotion 
of regional peace.12 Area one, Security First, is focused on the fight against 
terrorism to provide a safe environment to allow peace to grow.13 Security under 
the Oslo accords focused on counterterrorism principles to prevent suicide 
bombs by Palestinians and revenge attacks by Israeli settlers trying to establish 
facts on the ground. Dennis Ross in his book, The Missing Peace, under the Wye 
River agreements, refers to “normalization of relations, with full diplomatic 
relations” as a condition for security.14 Dennis Ross’s approach is 
 
                                            
11  J.D. Crouch II et al., Security First, 2. 
12  Palestine Liberation Organization, “Core Issues,” Palestine Liberation Organization, 
http://www.plomission.us/index.php?page=core-issues-3. 
13  J.D. Crouch II et al., Security First, 2. 
14  Ross, The Missing Peace : The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, 239. 
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comprehensive with a focus towards Security First. He contends that true and 
lasting security must start with negotiations, which is an element of Security 
First.15  
Area two is training and equipping a Palestinian security force.16  In his 
article, “Fixing Broken Windows,” Yezid Sayigh argues the Palestinian security 
sector must undergo reform. “To enable real reform, the West must adopt a 
comprehensive approach which treats security reform as only one part of a 
broader political strategy, and encourages governments and security 
commanders in Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen to buy into such a strategy.”17 
Supporting this argument is Lia Brynjar, as paraphrased by Sarah Salwen in her 
book review of Building Arafat’s Police. Brynjar shows the difficulty of, but the 
necessity for, security reform.  When nations donate help that focuses on 
immediate needs to support the peace process versus providing the necessary 
equipment designed to build a stable and self-sustaining security force, such as 
an effective communications system, handcuffs, and uniforms, the force will be 
incapable of meeting the greater need of providing security and creating a safe 
environment.18  Reform on the Israeli side is also necessary, since the focus of 
the military is to provide a secure environment for its citizens in Palestinian 
territory, a mission that under a two-state solution must be handed over to the 
Palestinians.  Relinquishing control of this mission will require strong guarantees 





                                            
15  Ross, The Missing Peace : The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, 238 
16  J.D. Crouch II et al., Security First, V.  
17  Yezid Sayigh, Fixing Broken Windows: Security Sector Reform in Palestine, Lebanon, 
and Yemen (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009). 
18 Brynjar Lia, “A Police Force without a State,” a review of A History of the Palestinian 
Security Forces in the West Bank and Gaza, by Sarah Salwen, Journal of Palestine Studies Book 
Review, June 3, 2008, 98. 
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Palestinians as allies in the peace process versus the enemy. The Israeli 
government sees this process being facilitated through disengagement and the 
building of the security wall.19  
Area three, the use of an international peacekeeping force to provide 
security in Palestinian territory and act as a buffer between the two parties, is one 
of the more hotly contested issues. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 
states, “No deployment of third-party troops, including NATO forces, will relieve 
the Palestinians from the requirement of securing their own territory.”20 They 
further argue that an international force would face significant obstacles, testing 
the resolve of the third nation support, and that this approach would only provide 
limited Palestinian sovereignty, creating an imperfect peace and continuing to 
drain the resources of a third party nation.21 Robert Hunter and Seth Jones argue 
the opposite, that the best method of instilling confidence and giving space for 
the Palestinians to take the responsibility for security is “stationing some form of 
international force along the Palestinian borders with Israel, Jordan and Egypt as 
part of a peace settlement.”22  They argue that giving room for Palestinians to 
take on the responsibility, as well as proper training, can only come with an 
outside force providing this type of intervention.  
I contend that, should a third nation force be employed within the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip territories, it would face numerous difficulties, from 
becoming the target by those who wish to see the peace process killed, to being 
the responsible party for building a nation. Any and all frustrations about the 
progress towards statehood by the Palestinians would be directed at the third 
                                            
19  Jonathan Rynhold, “Israel’s Fence: Can Separation make Better Neighbours?” Survival 




20  J.D. Crouch II et al., Security First, V. 
21  J.D. Crouch II et al., Security First, V. 
22  Robert E. Hunter, and Seth G. Jones, “An Independent Palestine: The Security 
Dimension,” International Affairs (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1944-) 80, no. 2 (2004); 
203. 
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party nation. In contrast, if a third nation military was employed as border 
security, it would not face these security challenges, and instead, would simply 
act as an overseer to the peace process.  
2. Economy  
There are two components to economic security. First is security for 
people and their assets. Providing security for a Palestinian territory 
simultaneously provides security for physical processes of economic production.  
Second is security of economic development. By first providing security for 
economic process, you then allow the next phase of development to occur.  
Through the development process, creation of new industries and jobs will begin 
to bring stability to the region.  As Palestine develops and becomes equal with 
Israel, their location and the necessity of sharing resources makes them natural 
trading partners.  Once Palestine is developed, multinational corporations can 
work between the two nations and begin to cement the security gains through 
cooperative economic partnerships. 
According to Rafael Reuveny, the Israeli–Palestinian economic relations 
debate centers on three positions within the capitalist peace construct: 
integration, partial integration, and economic separation.  The integration view is, 
both sides will have mutual benefit leading to closer ties and preventing violent 
reaction. This view argues that separating the two economies would have dire 
consequences to the Palestinians.  The partial integration view argues that, while 
both economies are not compatible, integration prevents long-term stability and 
separation will not allow for development of the weaker economy.  The 
supporters of the separation view warn that any other model will continue a 
balance in favor of Israel, thus perpetuating Palestinian dependence.23   
Arguing for free market and integration, Charles Boehmer and David 
Sobek say, 
                                            
23  Rafael Reuveny, “The Political Economy of Israeli-Palestinian Interdependence,” Policy 
Studies Journal 27, no. 4 (1999); 643. 
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Developed states, are more reliant on services for their economic 
growth, are less likely to push territorial claims, decreasing their 
involvement in interstate conflict.  Meanwhile, the poorest states, 
although they have more to gain through territorial expansion, have 
a decreased ability to pursue their objectives through military 
force.24  
Erik Gartzke, along with Stephen Brooks, supports this view: free markets 
have the power to unite two economies for the benefit to greater security and 
economic growth through regional trade agreements:25  
Free markets have the potential to free states from the looming 
prospect of recurrent warfare.  Capitalism encourages cooperation 
among states by creating conditions that make war unappealing or 
unnecessary.  Free markets create another venue to competition 
among countries, often containing minor conflicts below the level of 
military force.26 
Arguing for partial integration, both Jacob Metzer and Rafael Reuveny 
counter the integration view and believe the best approach for a stable peaceful 
economy is the second approach, “a dual economic approach that permits 
interaction among the units while highlighting the dimensions that separate 
them.”27 
Arguing for separation of the two economies, Arie Arnon and Sara Roy 
believe that since 1967, the Israeli policy towards Palestine is one of de-
development, which prevents a separate, distinct, political Palestinian entity from 
establishing.  They point to this policy as evidence that any form of integration 
will continue to undercut any ability of the Palestinian economy to grow.28 
                                            
24  Charles R. Boehmer and David Sobek, “Violent Adolescence: State Development and the 
Propensity for Militarized Interstate Conflict,” Journal of Peace Research 42, no. 1 (2005); 5. 
25  Stephen G. Brooks, Producing Security: Multinational Corporations, Globalization, and 
the Changing Calculus of Conflict, 129. 
26  James Gwartney, Robert Lawson and Erik Gartzke, Economic Freedom of the World: 
2005 Annual Report (Canada: The Fraser Institute, 2005), 29. 
27  Tarik M. Yousef, “Reviewed Work(s): The Divided Economy of Mandatory Palestine by 
Jacob Metzer,” The Journal of Economic History 61, no. 4 (2001); 1128. 
28  Arie Arnon, “Israeli Policy Towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories: The Economic 
Dimension, 1967–2007,” The Middle East Journal: 61, no. 4 (Autumn 2007, 2007); 573.  
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Economic reform and development for Palestine, if the economy is built on 
principles of free market, will provide the necessary revenue to run the state and 
provide resources for the security of a nation.  The majority of Palestinian budget 
revenue comes in the form of foreign aid; creating economic independence will 
lessen the third party involvement in the Palestinian dispute and potentially 
provide greater regional stability. Security policies such as closed borders, de-
development, and control of water rights each have the specific aim of limiting 
Palestinian economic growth.  
I contend that for a lasting peace, security policies must aim at providing 
the greatest opportunities for Palestinian economic development, requiring as 
much of a separation as possible from each other’s economies until they are on 
equal footing. Then, at a later time, the nations can reintegrate in a regional 
agreement, thus solidifying security arrangements.  
3. Politics 
The perspectives, history, and motivations of the leaders in Israel and 
Palestine are complex and shape the outcome of peace negotiations and thus 
the security arrangements.  Palestinians are fractured along ideological lines and 
are currently fighting a civil war.  This inability to unite keeps the dream of 
obtaining a homeland from ever materializing. At the same time, the constant 
pressure to protect one’s interests pushes the leaders towards an authoritarian 
style of rule. On the Israeli side, there is less corruption due to the greater 
transparency of the government, however, there are equally as many challenges 
from social pressures.  Israel’s history, born out of the Zionist movement and 
socialist in nature, conflicts at times and supports at other times a religious view 
of territorial claim promised by God. These territorial claims drive structure and 
attitudes of reconciliation within the peace process. 
On the Palestinian side, Fatah and Hamas are waging an internal battle 
over control of territory and the institution of Palestinian government. Yezid 
Sayigh states, “The nature of the PLO as an exile entity attempting to unite a 
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disparate Diaspora has necessarily resulted in an authoritarian leadership wary 
of the administrative, civilian, and social organizations needed to form a state.”29  
Mahjoob Zweiri argues that Fatah’s days are numbered due to rampant 
corruption and, in turn, people are seeking an alternative in Hamas.30  Amos 
Perlmutter makes a similar claim but states that Palestinian leadership is 
“authoritarian, non-inclusive and un-democratic.”31 Another claim to the 
Palestinian condition is Glenn Robinson, who argues that Palestinians are 
fractured not necessarily from their internal struggles for control but from outside 
influence. The political structure of Palestine makes it difficult to unite the security 
institutions under one ideological umbrella that is beholden to a constitution or 
system, not a party. Israel’s policy of land confiscations, economic segregation, 
and tight control over Palestinian development keeps Palestine from uniting and 
hinders the ability of the security institutions to provide the rule-of-law necessary 
for a stable peaceful environment.32 
On the Israeli side there are two main competing ideas about the 
geographic identity of Israel. Alan Richards and John Waterbury point to 
differences of identity based on secular socialism or religious nationalism.33 
Charles Smith, in his book, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, clarifies the 
difference of identity.  Smith charges that while the religious and Zionist 
movements both agree on the desire for a homeland in Palestine, the method is 
the distinguishing difference.  The religious approach is to wait for the hand of 
God to move and re-establish a state for the Jews, while the Zionists reject the 
religious approach and the idea of assimilating into European culture and place 
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the responsibility of state building on the shoulders of the people.34  On both 
sides, how one chooses to identify oneself and apply one’s ideology either 
through secular or religious models plays out in radical, violent protest or the 
potential for reconciliation. This, in turn, determines how each nation approaches 
security and homeland defense. Due to Palestinian fractures, the security needs 
for Israel, and the religious view of divine rights for the land, Israel is driven 
towards policies of isolating Palestine instead of encouraging development in 
security, economics, and government reform.  Palestinians, again, due to their 
fractures and inability to unite under one government free from corruption, 
creates frustration and vigilantism for the Palestinian cause against Israel.   
D. METHODS AND SOURCES  
This thesis assumes that a key component to Oslo’s failure was due to a 
failure to anticipate security needs.  More precisely, each side was able to 
identify what the security needs were, but it was lack of agreement on priority 
and method of approach that led to failed security. If you align the security 
requirements to accommodate the two-state solution, then Israel’s security 
objectives and concerns are more likely to be met than they are through 
continued occupation. Chapter II will look at the individual security concerns 
while Chapter VI with the IPB analysis will identify security threats. To help 
understand this aspect of the Oslo failure, this thesis will explore five security 
issues with three security policies and compare where each side put them in 
priority along with their desired objective.  Knowing each side’s priorities and 
objectives will go a long way to providing an understanding of how to bridge the 
gap in security needs.  The first security issue is terrorism with its three security 
policies being the security fence, policing the West Bank, and the blockade, the 
remaining four security issues are religious claims, settlements, the status of 
Jerusalem, and Borders and Occupation.  It was the failure to address these 
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ed. (Boston, New York: Bedford/ST. Martin’s, 2010), 26. 
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issues adequately and a prolonged process that contributed to an impatience 
with the process that led to the start of the second intifada.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will be divided into four sections: first, analysis of the issues 
surrounding the peace process as they relate to security concerns; second, a 
look at the security institutions both in Palestine and Israel; third, economic 
security; and fourth, the IPB analysis. Analysis of the security institutions is 
necessary to lay the foundation of understanding the mission, capabilities, and 
attitudes in each institution. Israel already boasts one of the most powerful 
military forces in the world and uses it to provide protection from both external 
threats as well as internal threats by Palestinian extremist groups.  It is important 
to understand what is needed for reconciliation through analysis of how its force 
is structured, its mission, and its attitude towards Palestine.  Palestine boasts no 
military but instead has multiple security institutions that are disjointed and 
pledge loyalty to different political parties. Their main focus is protecting the 
interests of the political party they are associated with, not the rule-of-law.  
Understanding how security functions in Palestine will provide better insight into 
their weaknesses and ultimately where opportunities exist to assist with 
encouraging the development of a modern, well-equipped security force that is 
focused on the rule-of-law. 
Using the completed picture of the security environment built by the IPB 
process, this thesis will provide a point in time of the current security disposition, 
as well as the geographic vulnerabilities, to these force structures.  Comparing 
the current security picture with the assumed security conditions of a two-state 
solution, will clearly show what is needed to reach a security environment to 
support the two-state solution.  By understanding the current state of security 
institutions, compared with what they should look like in a two-state solution, this 
thesis then can start to provide recommendations and considerations for 
developing the security environment that both sides can agree on. 
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II. STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES AND PEACE NEGOTIATION 
ISSUES 
Oslo opened the possibility of a peaceful resolution to a two-state solution.  
At the beginning, cautious optimism led to direct negotiations.  The United States 
and the European Union supported the process by encouraging the development 
and communication between government institutions from both sides.  
Differences were set aside to allow the negotiating teams to work through the 
difficult issues while confidence-building measures were instituted.  Intelligence 
sharing and joint security patrols were conducted. However, the processes failed.  
Some argue the Oslo process was too ambitious, that the final solution requiring 
resolution on every issue simultaneously was impractical.  Others argue that the 
West failed to push both sides on tough issues and hold each side to their 
commitments.35 The Oslo peace process did not fail because it was too 
ambitious or failed to provide accountability, rather it failed because both sides 
set separate policies that counteracted the two-state solution. Both sides set 
policy on individual issues to gain the best advantage when the time came for the 
final negotiations on borders, the right of refugees to return, water rights, and 
geographical control.  Because the borders were to be the last thing resolved, the 
incentive to create the conditions on the ground that would give the greatest 
advantages in the final negotiations created an environment destructive to the 
peace process and confidence building.  If borders were clearly agreed to, and 
the endstate identified at the outset of the process, the policies such as 
settlement growth and security cooperation would have been more inline with the 
peace process and the Oslo accords would have had a greater chance for 
success.  
Establishing policy based on individual issues instead of the overall 
objective, provides an advantage for the short term but can complicate resolution 
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of issues in the future and leads to a failure of strategic objectives for a two-state 
solution. For example, the Israeli government built a wall along the West Bank to 
provide greater security for its citizens. The wall the Israelis view as a “security 
barrier,” is a counterterrorism tactic that prevents terrorists from entering Israel.  
The Palestinians see this tactic as a way to isolate and arbitrarily determine 
borders without their input into the process. Any future negotiations and trust will 
be harder to achieve when a policy seeks issue-based goals instead of 
compromise for a two-state solution. An example of Palestinian policy based on 
an issue instead of the desire for a two-state solution is the creation of a 
Palestinian security force that is not in line with the Oslo agreements and, 
instead, caters to individual aspirations within the PLO, Fatah, or Hamas. It takes 
time to create a professional security force that holds loyalty to a system of 
government instead of individuals.  The Palestinian Authority, under Yasser 
Arafat’s direction, had to make concessions to numerous individuals in order to 
keep the Palestinians united.  His policies allowed him the greatest amount of 
control but kept the security system from developing in a way that would allow 
modernization and unity of effort, thus conflicting with the goals of a two-state 
solution.  
This thesis will focus more on Israeli policy while including as much of the 
analysis of Palestinian policy as possible.  The reason for this lopsided approach 
is simply that Israel is the senior partner; they determine much of the timetable, 
security conditions, and agenda, while Palestine is weaker and is dependent 
upon Israeli good will. It is precisely this imbalance that keeps Palestine weak 
and prevents them from gaining any leverage that would allow them to be equals.  
Over the years, Palestinians have had only two forms of leverage: diplomatic stall 
tactics in the hopes of getting a better deal, and violence.  
This thesis will review the background on each of the issues that hinders 
peaceful resolution and the policy perspective from both sides to determine the 
true objective as it relates to security considerations. By determining the focus 
and purpose of policy for each issue, we can start to determine if either side is 
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genuinely seeking a two-state solution and, if not, then recommend changes to 
policy that accomplishes the short-term concerns as well as facilitating a two-
state solution. The information in this chapter is important to understand because 
it is the backdrop to the security situation and relates directly to the IPB analysis 
in Chapter VI on border location, conventional threat, and policy intentions that 
prevent compromise. 
A. SECURITY ISSUE: TERRORISM 
Under the issue of counterterrorism, since the start of the second intifada 
in 2000, Israel established a number of counterterrorism policies.  These 
included building a security wall in the West Bank, policing Palestinian territories, 
and blockading the Gaza Strip, all with the aim of protecting its citizens and 
preventing access by terrorists to Israel.  According to the RAND Database of 
Worldwide Terrorism Incidents in 2000, the year the second intifada started, only 
one civilian was killed by terrorist actions. However, in 2001, 110 were killed, and 
in 2002, 329 were killed.36  From 2001 on, pressure mounted for the Israeli 
government to take action against terrorism because the Oslo peace process 
was failing to deliver security.  See Table 1 for year-by-year trends over the past 
decade for Israeli deaths from terrorist attacks. 
 
Year 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Fatalities 1 110 329 174 65 27 37 4 11 0 
Table 1.   Israeli Deaths from Terrorist Attacks37 
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Under the issue of terrorism this thesis will explore three policies the 
Israeli government developed to combat terrorism; the security Wall, policing in 
the West Bank, and the Blockade. 
1. Security Policy: The Security Fence “The Wall” 
Amid the rising death toll and civilians calling for a “Fence for life,” the 
Israeli government embarked on a plan in 2001 to build a wall entirely around the 
West Bank.  The first section was completed in July 2003. The stated purpose of 
the fence by the Israel Ministry of Defence was to provide security. “The Security 
Fence is a central component in Israel’s response to the horrific wave of 
terrorism emanating from the West Bank, resulting in suicide bombers who enter 
into Israel with the sole intention of killing innocent people.”38 Prior to the building 
of the fence, there were no clear borders between the West Bank and Israel. 
Cars were required to go through checkpoints, but pedestrians were able to walk 
across the border unimpeded. In 1996, while I attended university in Jerusalem, I 
had the freedom to walk back and forth across the armistice line in the West 
Bank around Jerusalem but when taking taxis, we were required to stop at 
checkpoints. The only recognized boundary was the “Green Line,” which was 
established in 1949 under the armistice agreements. Israel bases its legal 
authority for building a fence on the United Nations resolution 242, “… respect for 
and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within 
secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”39  Israel’s 
Ministry of Defence claims that the fence is not the creation of a border with 
Palestine because the nature of the fence is temporary and any borders must be 
agreed to through negotiations.40 
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The establishment of the route of the fence is complicated.  Israel is 
building the fence along the Green Line with deviations for considerations to 
Israeli settlements, environmental concerns, and social impact. If Israel were to 
stick strictly to the “Green Line” this fence could, in effect, recognize the 1967 
boundaries as legitimate and, international pressure would force Israel to make 
this the border, losing any claims to settlements in the West Bank.  By deviating 
from the Green Line, Israel maintains its ability to adjust boundaries in the future. 
To Israel’s credit, people affected by the fence have opportunities to appeal the 
proposed route and request its path be altered based on humanitarian concerns. 
However, according to Usama Halabi of the BADIL Resource Center for 
Palestinian Residency and Refugee Rights, by November 2006, the Palestinians 
brought 64 petitions before the Israeli Supreme Court. Of the 64 petitions, 47 
were rejected, 9 were resolved, and 8 were still outstanding.41 This shows only a 
12 percent success rate of Palestinians requesting an alteration to the location of 
the fence. While individuals have the ability to appeal, little evidence shows an 
open dialogue between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority on 
the location of the fence.  Rather, the Palestinian Authority uses the issue of the 
fence as a political lightning rod for its purposes. By looking at chart 1 and the 
decline in the number of Israeli deaths through the latter part of the decade, the 
trend suggests that the development of a security fence is achieving its security 
aims. 
But, what about the unintended consequences? Do the Palestinians view 
the fence as a border that protects them from radical Israeli settlers or as another 
way to control their daily lives?  In Stephen Lendman’s article “Israel’s Separation 
Wall: A Health Hazard,” he describes the impact on the daily life of the 
Palestinians and how they must adapt. He states that the amount of territorial 
difference between the location of the security fence and the green line is about 
12 percent of the West Bank with 33,000 Palestinians residing in the seam 
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zones, the space between the green line and the security fence.42 He goes on to 
describe how a total of 187,000 Palestinians are surrounded, need special 
identity cards to live in their own homes, or must take a tunnel or special road to 
reach their communities.  With the Palestinian population at 2.5 million in the 
West Bank as of 2010, this means that 13.2 percent are affected every day in 
their livelihood, ability to receive medical treatment, and ability to get 
consumables for living. The Palestinian Liberation Organization sees the security 
fence as Israel attempting to legitimize settlements in the West Bank. “In 
particular, the route the Wall takes is designed to capture as much land and 
incorporate as many Israeli settlers as possible west of the Wall, while shutting 
out and ‘walling in’ as many Palestinians as possible east of the Wall.”43 While 
Israel built the fence for security reasons, simultaneously the fence is able to 
isolate and constrain the Palestinian economy even further.   
The fence is contentious to say the least. For Israel it provides some of the 
security it has been seeking since its creation in 1948, but for the Palestinians it 
serves as a physical reminder of being occupied.  In the game of peace making, 
perceptions are important and can sway a populace to support the peace 
process or reject it.  For the Israeli population, the perception is that the fence is 
achieving the security policies and is therefore supported, even though the 
existence of the fence is a detriment to lasting peace. The Palestinians view the 
fence as a way to apply greater pressure on them collectively and force an 
agreement to terms favoring the Israelis and an attempt to put them under 
conditions that would drive them out of Palestine and into other nations.  While 
the fence has worked for security means, it has failed to assist with bringing 
negotiations closer to resolution and, if anything, has made negotiations more 
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difficult because the Palestinians have more reason to question the intentions of 
the Israelis in relation to the existence of a Palestinian state. In July 2009, 
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas questioned the Israeli president’s 
intentions in regards to the fence and stated “The racial separation wall as well 
as settlements are both illegal… and the wall must be removed.”44 Thus, this 
thesis concludes that the policy of security through the building of a security 
fence is designed with the intention of short-term Security First and the 
development of a leverage point in negotiations at the expense of long-term 
peace. In the IPB analysis I will take into account the Washington Institute for 
Middle East Policy border recommendations, which follow along similar lines as 
the security fence.  
2. Security Policy: Policing the West Bank 
Under the Oslo accords, backed by the United States, Dennis Ross, under 
guidance by President Bush and President Clinton, pursued a Security First 
agenda.45  This agenda called for the creation of a Palestinian security force 
working in concert with Israeli security. It was believed that by creating a secure 
environment, civilians would demand their leaders finish the rest of the tasks of 
permanent peace because the citizens would not want to go back to the days of 
violence.  It was also assumed that once this secure environment was achieved 
that all the other issues, economics, borders, status of Jerusalem, etc., would be 
easier to solve due to the mutual respect and trust that was built by the process 
of Security First.46 To this aim, under the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement in 
Article XI, Land; both sides, along with the United States, agreed to divide the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip into three types of areas of responsibility.  Areas A, B, 
and C are the geographical representation of the phased withdrawal of Israeli 
forces and the handing over of responsibility for self governing to the Palestinian 
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Authority.47 Area A was to be administered by the Palestinian Authority and 
contained much of the Palestinian population, area B was under joint control, and 
area C was to be under Israeli control.48  
Contentions arose between the negotiation teams when both sides 
expressed different expectations based on the Oslo accords on meeting the 
agreed timetables. The Oslo accords stated in Article XIII, Redeployment of 
Israeli Forces, paragraph 1; “After the entry into force of this Declaration of 
Principles, and not later than the eve of elections for the Council, a redeployment 
of Israeli military forces in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip will take place, in 
addition, a withdrawal of Israeli forces carried out in accordance with Article 
XIV.”49 The Palestinian delegation, interpreted this paragraph as an agreement 
that prior to Palestinian elections, the West Bank and Gaza Strip, would be 
handed over to the Palestinian police for security and autonomy.50 Because the 
Israelis interpreted the very next paragraph in the Oslo accords as open to 
creating security boundaries, the Israeli negotiators demanded Israel control 
much of the West Bank beyond the agreed timeline, “In redeploying its military 
forces, Israel will be guided by the principle that its military forces should be 
redeployed outside populated areas.”51 In terms of security, the Oslo accords 
spelled out detailed timelines for negotiations, however, the accords also left 
things open to interpretation.  This approach was intended to give the negotiators 
room to maneuver and at the same time, reach a political agreement to start the 
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process.  This created a problem later when both sides interpreted the language 
of the framework with their own bias and expectations of what the language 
meant. 
In the mid- to late 90s, through the Oslo peace process, cooperation 
between Palestinian police and Israeli military was contentious but forced.  Abu 
Ala, a chief Palestinian negotiator, in one of the negotiation sessions 
acknowledged the need for security cooperation but offered his observations of 
the relationship as follows: 
But you continue to behave like our masters. It seems to me that a 
good part of your army is not aware of the partnership implied by 
the agreements. Each time we must pass through a 
checkpointand there are many of themyour soldiers try to 
trample on our dignity by making us wait for hours or by throwing 
our identity cards on the ground so that we have to stoop before 
them in public view. I have no complaints about you; we sit here as 
equals. But out there, on the ground, your people behave as if 
nothing has changed.52 
Even though the Oslo process collapsed, an expectation persists that 
Israel will withdraw from the West Bank according to the Oslo Accords, and give 
Palestine autonomy. This gives room for optimism and an ability to return to the 
process even after a time of violence and protest.  However, differences in 
expectations and interpretation keep the two sides divided with little ability to 
bridge that divide. Maybe it’s time to attempt a different approach, one that puts 
both sides at the same starting point for negotiations.  Starting any peace 
initiative with a defined border will achieve this aim and geographically confine 
each issue. The IPB analysis will hopefully prove this point.  
3. Security Policy: Blockade  
In 2004, Prime Minister Arial Sharon decided to implement a plan of 
disengagement. The plan was born out of the idea of attempting to pressure the 
Palestinians toward peace while ensuring greater security for Israel. Four years 
                                            
52  Savir, 1,100 Days that Changed the Middle East, 167–168. 
 32
after the peace process collapsed at the end of President Clinton’s term and with 
the second intifada in full swing, the peace process was going nowhere. The 
world was waiting for the Palestinian internal political climate to change, namely 
through the death of Yasser Arafat. Shortly after Yasser Arafat’s death, 
speculation that Israel conducted an assassination surfaced.  In 2009, doctors 
were asked to look into the evidence to conclude whether he was poisoned.53 
This highlights the continued distrust between both sides over negotiations and 
intentions of resolving the dispute peaceably.  
Justification for the disengagement plan states, “Israel has come to the 
conclusion that there is currently no reliable Palestinian partner with which it can 
make progress in a bilateral peace process. Accordingly, it has developed a plan 
of unilateral disengagement.”54 The plan called for the isolation of the Gaza Strip 
and the removal of all Israeli settlements, in effect, the blockade of Gaza was 
underway.  Israel maintained that it had the authority under self-defense to 
establish a security perimeter. Ariel Sharon stated, “Israel will guard and monitor 
the external land perimeter of the Gaza Strip, will continue to maintain exclusive 
authority in Gaza air space, and will continue to exercise security activity in the 
sea off the coast of the Gaza Strip.”55 Two years after this plan was adopted, 
Hamas won the 2006 Palestinian elections. Much analysis about why Hamas 
won the elections points to the corrupt nature of the Palestinian leaders under the 
PLO and Fatah.56  While Hamas made overtures of peace through the use of 
hudna, a temporary armistice, it gained popularity through its stance on 
confronting Israel and rejecting the current peace process. Israel’s blockade and 
isolation of the Gaza strip was a major factor directly contributing to Hamas’ 
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increase in popularity. Hamas’ victory was a surprise to everyone including 
Hamas. It was possibly Israel’s blockade that propelled them to victory. 
In Palestinian politics, 2006 was a watershed year.  Hamas took control of 
the Palestinian government, which exposed the fissures and vulnerabilities in the 
Palestinian political structures. Hamas is the polar opposite to Fatah in all 
aspects, political, religious, social, and even in its approach to a Palestinian 
identity. The purported goal of Hamas is to reorient state and society toward a 
more thoroughgoing “piety-mindedness.” That is, to say, a more profound sense 
of Islamic identity rooted in the reformation of cultural practices, legal structures, 
and governing institutions according to the religio-legal ethic of the sharia.57 
Control of government services becomes the battleground between competing 
political ideologies, and how one identifies oneself in relation to a Palestinian 
state. One can choose a secular avenue in Fatah or a religiously leaning 
government structure as found in Hamas.  How one identifies oneself determines 
one’s loyalty. 
The Israeli disengagement plan correctly identified the failure of a 
Palestinian partner in the peace process. The disengagement plan isolated 
Hamas, exposed Palestinian public opinion towards its government, and pushed 
Palestinian society to the brink of civil war. In June 2007, Hamas took control of 
Gaza and effectively divided the Palestinian people along political and religious 
lines between the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  By the time the dust settled, Fatah 
was in control in the West Bank, recognized by western powers as the only 
authority to represent Palestinians in the peace process. Hamas was in control of 
the Gaza Strip as a radical element bent on the destruction of Israel. Since 2007, 
Palestinians have been living under a fractured government, or rather, two 
separate governments, there is no one voice capable of uniting the people in one 
direction that can achieve the peace, stability, and land they desire for a nation. 
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The blockade has achieved its goals of isolating the Gaza Strip, provided 
greater security for Israeli citizens and destroyed any chance of a central 
Palestinian political entity. A two-state solution requires a unified Palestinian 
approach to peace because a three-state solution keeps the Palestinians 
disjointed and working against each other. Only time will tell if Palestinians can 
first set aside their differences long enough to build a unity government and then 
engage on a peace plan. 
B. SECURITY ISSUE: RELIGIOUS CLAIMS FOR THE LAND 
Understanding the dispute between Palestinians and Israelis requires an 
understanding of identity based on religious tradition. While many Jews in Israel 
are not religious and the Palestinian population is divided between Islamic and 
Christian religions, religious history and tradition is perhaps the greatest 
underlying influence on identity and claims for territorial rights. 
From an historical perspective, the land on which Israel and Palestine now 
reside, the people have been conquered, re-conquered, exiled, repopulated, and 
claimed as territory by one country or another more times than can be counted.  
The archeological record proves this violent trend. Using one of the monotheistic 
religions to assert one’s claim as justification for possession assumes legitimacy 
and authority of one’s religion and de-legitimacy over others.  Simultaneously, 
one’s identity becomes synonymous with God’s/Allah’s promises and to 
compromise on His promises is turning your back on your religious convictions 
and identity. 
All three religions, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, agree that God 
promised to Abraham that his descendants would receive the land as an 
inheritance.  This promise is part of the Abrahamic covenant found in Genesis 
17:8: “The whole land of Canaan, where you now reside as a foreigner, I will give 
as an everlasting possession to you and your descendants after you; and I will be 
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their God.”58 In ancient times, inheritance was passed on to the first male child; 
the rest of the children got nothing or very little. Abraham had two sons of 
significance.  His first born, Ishmael, was from his wife’s maidservant Hagar.  
Abraham’s second born, Isaac, was from his wife Sarah. Where the narrative 
differs is to whom the inheritance was passed.  In Genesis 22, Abraham is 
commanded to offer his son as a sacrifice to God as a way of showing his 
obedience.  Abraham offers his son, and in the last moment, the angel of the 
Lord stops him and is pleased that he was willing to be obedient to the point of 
sacrificing his own son. In Genesis 22:15-18, God reconfirms His covenant with 
Abraham and his son after the test of obedience: 
Because you have done this and have not withheld your son, your 
only son, I will surely bless you and make your descendants as 
numerous as the stars in the sky and as the sand on the seashore. 
Your descendants will take possession of the cities of their 
enemies, and through your offspring all nations on earth will be 
blessed, because you have obeyed me.59   
Both the Jewish and Christian religions believe that the son placed on the 
altar for sacrifice and to receive the blessing from God was Isaac.  The Islamic 
religion believes the son to be Ishmael. In the biography The Life of Muhammad, 
Qisas al Anbiyd', Shaykh `Abd al Wahhab al Najjar bases his conclusion of 
Ishmael being the one chosen for sacrifice on the Qur’anic description of the 
sacrificial son as unique.60  In this context, Ishmael is only unique as long as 
Isaac is not born yet.  For the Islamic narrative the debate centers on the timing 
of the event to claim Ishmael as the son along with a belief that Jewish 
theologians changed the scriptures at a later date to suit their needs.  
Why is understanding the significance between these two religions 
important?  Judaism traces their lineage to Abraham through Isaac.  If Isaac is 
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the correct son, then the covenant with Abraham is extended to the nation of 
Israel and therefore they are the legitimate owners of the land and the correct 
path to a relationship to God.  Any other territorial claims based on religious 
views not in accordance with this narrative would be considered false. Equally, 
the Islamic tradition traces its lineage to Abraham through Ishmael.  The same 
logic applies that any territorial claims based on religious views not in accordance 
to Islam would be false.  Thus, Israel’s territorial claim of the land becomes part 
of receiving the inheritance and blessing of God as well as proof of the legitimacy 
of their religion.  If Israel is allowed to exist on this land, then the whole of Islamic 
identity and legitimacy is called into question. 
How does the significance of this event that occurred 4,000 years ago 
relate to security today? In the West Bank reside 300,000 Israeli citizens known 
as settlers.  The settler movement is based on the idea of expanding Israeli 
territory to achieve the promises of God. While the government of Israel is 
secular in nature, or partially, as the state supports religion in various ways, it 
uses this idea to assist the settlers with their agenda and, in turn, provide greater 
control of the West Bank, creating greater security for the nation as a whole.  
Settlements are a double-edged sword.  From one perspective, the greater the 
amount of territory and key terrain under Israeli control, the greater security Israel 
has.  By holding key terrain in the West Bank, Israel holds strategic dominance 
over the Palestinians, as well as preventing any direct threats to Israel proper.  
Simultaneously, control of water is key to the economic survival and development 
of both Israeli and Palestinian agricultural segments of the economy, at least until 
desalinization is more universal. On the other hand, the more settlers in the West 
Bank, the more targets of opportunity there are for terrorists to attack Israeli 
citizens and, thus, the greater the burden on Israeli security obligations.  See the 
next section on settlements for more details. 
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C. SECURITY ISSUE: SETTLEMENTS 
The status of settlements in the West Bank is one of the biggest obstacles 
to peace negotiations.  Settlements not only represent territory the Palestinians 
feel they are losing, but they are also a security challenge to the Israeli 
government.  As discussed earlier, to meet the security challenges, Israel is 
building the security fence to provide protection for its citizens. According to 
Chaim Levinson from an article in Haaretz, an Israeli Defense Force report in 
June 2009 states that approximately 300,000 Jewish settlers live in the West 
Bank.61  The Israeli government maintains that the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
“were not under the sovereignty of any state and came under Israeli control in a 
war of self-defense.” 62 Currently, no sovereign state other than Israel holds 
claim to the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  The Palestinian Authority, while claiming 
the 1967 “Green Line” as the defacto border for a Palestinian state, is not 
recognized internationally as a state and, therefore, cannot claim sovereignty 
over any territory.  From the Israeli perspective, at best, the land in question is 
disputed territory under the sovereignty of Israel.  Since Israel, in effect, owns the 
land, any settlements built would not be considered illegal.  
In a study conducted by the Human Sciences Research Council, 
Occupation, Colonialism, Apartheid?, a team of legal researchers and lawyers 
attempt to define the status of Israeli activities in Palestinian territories according 
to international law. Using the International Humanitarian Law and the Fourth 
Geneva Convention of which Israel ratified in 1951, the study defines the 
difference between invasion and occupation finding that Israel is indeed an 
occupier. 
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Invasion is the marching or riding of troops—or the flying of military 
aircraft—into enemy country. Occupation is invasion plus taking 
possession of enemy country for the purpose of holding it, at any 
rate temporarily. The difference between mere invasion and 
occupation becomes apparent from the fact that an occupant sets 
up some kind of administration, whereas the mere invader does 
not.63 
Israel vehemently rejects this interpretation of the Geneva Convention 
even though a UN resolution that was unanimously passed on July 15, 1999, 
states, “the Fourth Geneva Convention does apply to Israeli settlements in the 
“occupied territories”’.64 
While the international law favors Palestine in regards to settlements, it is 
in Israel’s interest for peace to limit the scope and purpose of the settlements to 
accommodate Palestinian self-rule.  If the Israeli policy on settlements is, indeed, 
what Ariel Sharon said to Winston Churchill III in 1973, then peace is not the 
objective but domination and territorial control.  
We’ll make a pastrami sandwich of them.  We’ll insert a strip of 
Jewish settlements in between the Palestinians, and then another 
strip of Jewish settlements right across the West Bank, so that in 25 
years, neither the United Nations, nor the U.S.A., nobody, will be 
able to tear it apart.65  
A simple analysis of the trend in settlement construction should point to 
what the true objective is.  If peace and security with a two-state solution is truly 
the objective, then the trend of new settlement construction would be on the 
decline.  If the objective is to expand Israeli borders or achieve a demographic 
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monopoly then the trend in new settlement construction would show an increase 
in settlements. Figure 2 shows the trend in construction of new housing units in 
the West Bank. 
 
 
Figure 2.   New Construction (Housing Units)66 
As we can see from Figure 2, settlement development is holding even 
between 1,500 and 2,000 new units a year since 2001.  This represents a 
constant increase in settlements in the West Bank and puts Israel on a policy 
towards demographic manipulation. 
The Palestinian perspective of legality or illegality on settlements, hinges 
on defining Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza as an occupier.  The 
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Palestinian authorities have defined the Israeli presence as an occupying force 
since 1967 as has the world.  Under this perspective, the PLO Negotiations 
Affairs Department points to the Fourth Geneva Convention, article 49 (6) as 
proof of the illegality of settlement development.67 “The Occupying Power shall 
not deport or transfer parts of its own civilian population into the territory it 
occupies.”68 In addition, Palestinian authorities point to approved United Nations 
Security Council Resolutions as confirmation of international law identifying Israel 
as an occupying force and its activities as illegal.  UNSCR 452 states, 
Considering that the policy of Israel in establishing settlements in 
the occupied Arab territories has no legal validity and constitutes a 
violation of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection 
of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August, 12 1949.69   
UNSCR 465 also states,  
… determines that all measures taken by Israel to change the 
physical character, demographic composition, institutional structure 
or status of the Palestinian and other Arab territories occupied 
since 1967, including Jerusalem, or any part thereof have no legal 
validity and that Israel’s policy and practices of settling parts of its 
population and new immigrants in those territories constitute a 
flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War and also constitute a 
serious obstruction to achieving a comprehensive, just and lasting 
peace in the Middle East.70 
Justification for and definition of Israeli presence in Arab territory rests on 
international law. While international commissions or individual countries may 
condemn one side or the other for their actions on this issue, in practice, the 
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world is pushing for a solution to come from agreement instead of a verdict from 
an outside force.  In the meantime Israel is setting conditions on the ground that 
are favorable to its outcome. 
D. SECURITY ISSUE: STATUS OF JERUSALEM 
The significance of Jerusalem lies in its religious preeminence to all three 
monotheistic religions.  It is the location where Abraham offered his son as a 
sacrifice; where the Dome of the Rock now stands on the Temple Mount, where 
the Jewish Temple, the center of Jewish faith was located; where Christ’s death 
and resurrection occurred, and where Mohammad departed for his Night Journey 
to meet Allah face to face.  The Temple Mount is the epicenter for the 
significance of Jerusalem for all three religions.  To the Jews it is their connection 
to history and devotion to God.  For Christians, the Temple Mount is a 
representation of the Temple in Heaven and for some Christians the location for 
the fulfillment of future prophesy.  For Muslims, the Temple Mount is the third 
holiest location on earth and is the starting place where Mohammad went to meet 
Allah.   
Originally a Jebusite city, King David conquered the city and established it 
as his capital in 1004 B.C.E. For nearly 1100 years, Jerusalem was the capital of 
Israel or Judah. In 70 A.D., Rome conquered Jerusalem, destroyed the Second 
Temple, expelled the people and ended the nation of Israel until 1948. In 638 the 
city was brought under Islamic rule.  With the exception of approximately 120 
years, from 1099 to 1187 and from1229 to 1244 under Christian rule, Jerusalem 
remained under Islamic rule approximately 1190 years. In international law there 
are no statutes of limitations and both Israelis and Palestinians have justifiable 
historical claims to the city. 
The status of Jerusalem is inked to the religious concept of the physical 
inheritance along with historical justification. The Israeli government officially 
states, “There has always been a national consensus in Israel on the status of 
Jerusalem. Since the reunification of the city in 1967, all Israeli Governments 
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have declared their policy that united Jerusalem, Israel's eternal capital is one 
indivisible city under Israeli sovereignty and that free access to holy places and 
freedom of worship will continue to be guaranteed to members of all faiths.”71  
The PLO states that Israel has no legal authority over East Jerusalem; however, 
they are in agreement over the unification of Jerusalem. “Within Jerusalem, 
irrespective of the resolution of the question of sovereignty, there should be no 
physical partition that would prevent the free circulation of persons within it.”72 
With both sides saying similar things, it would seem on the surface that there 
should not be an issue with Jerusalem.  The unspoken dilemma is not over how 
the city should be run but who should run the city.  Neither side is willing to 
partition the city and neither is willing to live under the other’s rule. 
Israeli policy on Jerusalem is linked to the policy on the security fence in 
the West Bank.  The path that the fence takes incorporates East Jerusalem into 
the city and allows Israel further developments as well as sets conditions on the 
ground favorable for a unified Jerusalem under Israeli control.  
E. SECURITY ISSUE: BORDERS/OCCUPATION 
The victors of the Six Day War in 1967 found themselves in control of 
Arab lands.  To the north, Israel took possession of the Golan Heights from the 
Syrians, to the West, they took the West Bank from the Jordanians, and to the 
South they took control of the Gaza Strip along with the Sinai Peninsula from the 
Egyptians.  The current borders between Israel, Egypt, and Jordan were set in 
place through peace negotiations.  Most notably, the Camp David agreement on 
September 17, 1978, set the framework for negotiations and the process that 
later was used in the Oslo accords.  Through negotiations, Egypt gave up any 
claim to the Gaza Strip and established a border with Israel that remains in effect 
today.  Jordan gave up claims to the West Bank and established the Jordan 
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River in the Jordan valley as the border with Israel. The border in the north along 
the Lebanon border is relatively undisputed; the only contention is the Shebaa 
Farm area and the Golan Heights. It is likely this border will remain unchanged 
unless readjustments to the agreements are made between Israel and Syria.  
While Hezbollah is a terrorist group with an anti-Israeli agenda, their dispute is 
not over the location of the borders but with the whole existence of Israel.  
Recently Hezbollah’s focus shifted to internal politics in Lebanon and gaining 
power more then fighting a war with Israel.  However, they gain legitimacy for 
their hard-line stance against Israel and will use this as platform when it suits 
their agenda as long as their survival is not threatened. The security concern in 
the north derives from the fear that Hezbollah is acting as Iran’s proxy and 
threatens Israel to achieve Iranian objectives. 
The Camp David Accords, while achieving peace between Israel and 
Egypt, attempted to resolve the Palestinian problem. “Egypt, Israel, Jordan and 
the representatives of the Palestinian people should participate in negotiations on 
the resolution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects.”73 After achieving 
peace with Israel, Egyptians and Jordanians had little incentive to push 
negotiations for a resolution to the Palestinian issue. The Camp David Accords 
placed the responsibility in the hands of the Palestinians to achieve a 
government that could govern its people and, once this was achieved, the Camp 
David Accords called for Israel to withdraw, giving room for a Palestinian 
government to stand up and begin the process of negotiations over territory as 
stipulated in UN Resolution 242. 
UN Resolution 242 set two principles for peace. First, “withdrawal of Israeli 
armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict,” and second, 
“Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and 
acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political 
                                            




independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within 
secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”74 The 
Camp David Accords state under the Framework, “they therefore agree that this 
framework, as appropriate, is intended by them to constitute a basis for peace 
not only between Egypt and Israel, but also between Israel and each of its other 
neighbors which is prepared to negotiate peace with Israel on this basis.”75 
Additionally the Camp David Accords under the Framework section A, West 
Bank and Gaza, paragraph A states, “In order to provide full autonomy to the 
inhabitants, under these arrangements the Israeli military government and its 
civilian administration will be withdrawn as soon as a self-governing authority has 
been freely elected by the inhabitants of these areas to replace the existing 
military government.”76 The Camp David Accords, being tied to the UN 
Resolution 242, changes the status of the land the Palestinians live on.  As long 
as Egypt and Jordan had claim to the Gaza Strip and West Bank, the land fell 
under international laws of occupation.  Israel occupied land that rightfully 
belonged to a nation state.  The Camp David Accords abolished Egypt and 
Jordan’s claim to this land and instead gave the responsibility of negotiations for 
the land to the Palestinians. The Palestinians must establish a State first in a 
legal framework while agreeing to the peace process before they are able to 
negotiate borders. Since no state claims authority over the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip the land is not occupied by Israel and instead falls under the legal 
framework of disputed territory.  Using this logic, Israel disagrees with the UN 
resolution and the interpretation by the international community on the Fourth 
Geneva Convention. 
The issue over occupation of disputed territory, while interesting, is not the 
focus of this discussion.  The Palestinian Authority uses the framework of 
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occupation as a way to describe the plight of the Palestinians.  This keeps them 
in the position of the victim and gains sympathy and support from the rest of the 
world.  By remaining in the position of the victim instead of establishing a state 
under the confines as laid out in the peace processes, Palestine is incapable of 
negotiating in good faith.  Since there is no Palestinian state, the only legal 
framework the Palestinians have in dealing with border issues is the pre-67 
Green Line.  The PLO’s official stance on the border is, “The PLO has accepted 
that Israel’s 1967 Pre-Occupation borders (the “Green Line”) shall serve as the 
international border between the states of Palestine and Israel.”77 However, there 
is a problem with using the Armistice Agreement written February 24, 1949, as 
the basis for the Green Line. Article V, paragraph 2, states, “The Armistice 
Demarcation Line is not to be construed in any sense as a political or territorial 
boundary, and is delineated without prejudice to rights, claims and positions of 
either Party to the Armistice as regards ultimate settlement of the Palestine 
question.”78 As long as the Palestinian Authority remains just a representative of 
the Palestinian people instead of an internationally recognized state, the 
Palestinian Authority has no legal redress for actions taken by the Israeli 
government and no ability to determine its borders. 
F. SECURITY ISSUE: REFUGEES, RIGHT OF RETURN 
At the end of World War II, Britain found itself in control of Palestine. Due 
to Great Britain expending too many men and too much material in an area that 
no longer held any strategic significance, Great Britain decided by 1947 to give 
the responsibility of maintaining peace to the United Nations. The United Nations 
on November 29, 1947 passed resolution 181, which took a course of partitioning 
Palestine and establishing a two-state solution. Between December, 1947 and 
May 14, 1948, violence erupted and both sides committed acts of terrorism. 
Victims included women, children, and noncombatants from all ethnicities.  Due 
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to the violence in the run up to the creation of Israel, approximately 15,000 Arabs 
fled to safety either to Palestinian areas in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, or 
other Arab states.  The Muftis called for Arabs to stay and requested Arab states 
not to grant entry.79 According to Charles Smith, in his book, Palestine and the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict, through the course of the war that started on May 15, 1948, 
an additional 400,000 to 450,000 Palestinian refugees were expelled or fled.80 
In preparation for the establishment of the state of Israel, David Ben-
Gurion authorized a military plan designed to defend Israel. There is much 
debate over the Hagana Plan Dalet and what its true intentions were. The Israeli 
government claims that the Hagana Plan Dalet was defensive in nature and that 
“Israel does not bear any culpability for the creation or perpetuation of the 
Palestinian refugee problem.”81  They go on to say that “The immediate source of 
the refugee problem was, in fact, the Arabs’ rejection in 1947 of the UN General 
Assembly Resolution 181. Resolution 181 would have partitioned the British 
Mandate area into an Arab state and a Jewish state.”82 According to the Hagana 
Plan Dalet, as translated by Walid Khalidi, under section (b), Consolidation of 
Defense Systems and Fortifications, the plan calls for “Mounting operations 
against enemy population centers located inside or near our defensive system in 





                                            
79  ‘Charles D. Smith’, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 
197. 
80  Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 203. 
81  Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israel, the Conflict and Peace: The Peace Process with 
the PalestiniansIsrael Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2009), 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/FAQ/FAQ_Peace_process_with_Palestinians_Dec_2009.  
82  Ibid. 
83  Walid Khalidi, “Plan Dalet: Master Plan for the Conquest of Palestine,” Journal of 
Palestine Studies 18, no. 1 (Autumn 1988), 
http://www.jstor.org.libproxy.nps.edu/stable/pdfplus/2537591.pdf?acceptTC=true. 
 47
One method to be employed was “Destruction of villages (setting fire to, blowing 
up, and planting mines in the debris), especially those population centers which 
are difficult to control continuously.”84 
Whether the plan called for the forced removal of Palestinians from their 
homes or not is immaterial.  The Palestinian movements claim Israeli aggression 
as justification for resistance to an Israeli government and tie the Palestinian 
identity to the land that Israel controls.  The fact is that before the creation of 
Israel, Palestinians lived on some of the land that is now controlled by Israel.  
How individuals became refugees is too difficult to assign culpability to any one 
party.  Arab armies are just as guilty as the Israeli militias for creating the 
problem.  War always causes difficulties and devastation for the innocent and 
civilian populations. The question is not how they became refugees, but how do 
we end the refugee problem today? 
As stated earlier, Israel’s policy is one of denying any responsibility, 
therefore, it claims no obligation for restitution or inclusion of Arabs into the state 
of Israel.  Most recently Benjamin Netanyahu said “he would renew a temporary 
halt of settlement construction in the West Bank in exchange for Palestinian 
recognition of Israel as a Jewish state.”85 Should the Palestinian Authority agree 
to this precondition it effectively gives up its claim for the “right of return” of 
Palestinian refugees.  By affirming the State of Israel as a Jewish nation, the 
Palestinians would agree that the land belongs to the Jews and, therefore, they 
have no claim on the land from that point on, not including the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip. 
There is no Palestinian government, only organizations attempting to lead 
and dictate the terms of Palestinian identity according to their objectives.  The 
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Palestinian Authority is charged by the international community to build a 
government and provide for the welfare of its population. Fatah and Hamas are 
involved in a fight over control and it is the will of the people that will determine 
which organization will be the representative of the Palestinian people. According 
to the United Nation’s 2007 census, 1.55 million refugees live in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip.86 With a total population size of 2.35 million, this means that 
65 percent of the Palestinian population are refugees.87 With the high percentage 
of the Palestinian population in refugee status, any leader or organization that 
compromises on the issue over the “right of return” will soon find themselves out 
of a job. 
The Palestinian refugee problem was created when war broke out 
between Arab nations and the newly created State of Israel in 1948. All sides are 
guilty for creating the conditions that led to refugees leaving their homes.  With 
two peoples claiming ownership of the same piece of land, for peace to succeed, 
one group must be willing to forgo its claim to the land to achieve peace. 
Restitution and compensation, as well as compromise, must be part of the 
equation to resolve this issue.  Neither side will be completely happy with the end 
result, but the final arrangement must be acceptable to both sides for peace to 
succeed.  
G. DISCUSSION 
Israeli policy towards Palestine is one focused on providing security for its 
own citizens while keeping the Palestinians weak.  Palestinians have very little 
leverage or ability to influence negotiations except through the use of stalling 
diplomatic negotiations, in the hopes of gaining a better deal or through the use 
of violent protest. Looking at Israel’s policies to combat terrorism through the 
construction of a security fence, continued policing, and blockading the Gaza 
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Strip, it is clear that at this time Israel is not interested in a two-state solution but 
rather keeping the status quo. Their policies isolate, limit Palestinian capabilities, 
and attempt to gain a demographic monopoly over the West Bank. As shown, 
Israel’s policies effectively divided the Palestinian population and prevented the 
development of a strong partner interested in negotiating peace. The Palestinian 
population is fractured and unable to unite in an effort to establish one 
government.  The unifying factor for the Palestinian population is the hatred for 
Israel. If they are ever able to agree on a unified front, then they would be able to 
either confront Israel or unite behind a government that is strong enough to be 
their voice and achieve peace.  The fear that Israel has for a united Palestine is 
that it would be united in its endeavors to destroy Israel instead of united in its 
desire for peace. This is the reason Israel pursues policies that keep the 
Palestinians weak and controls Palestine in a way that is acceptable and 
compatible with Israel’s security needs. Israel is certainly willing to live with a 
peaceful Palestine but a peaceful Palestine must develop on Israel’s terms.  
Israel currently uses the security fence, policing in the West Bank, and the 
Blockade of the Gaza Strip as methods to prevent terrorism, of which the trend in 
the attack data demonstrates success. However, at what cost are these methods 
employed? These methods provide security but also prevent a two-state solution 
from maturing. The Palestinian people view the relationship with Israel as one of 
jailor and prisoner instead of as equal partners desiring the same end. Religious 
views from both Jewish and Islamic perspectives push the political dynamic away 
from resolution over their inability to reach common ground over the right of 
inheritance and legitimacy. Both hold the view that they are right and the other is 
not just wrong but is a false religion and worthy of destruction.  
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III. ECONOMICS 
What is the cost of security in Israel and Palestine?  Each entity spends a 
high percentage of its GDP to guarantee its security.  Are these two entities 
getting their money’s worth or, if they were to invest in markets, would they be 
more secure in the long run?  Conversely, what is the best approach to assist a 
developing country? Should the international community encourage the reform of 
government institutions, or through the development of free markets and 
Regional Trade Agreement?  One side of the spectrum says that you must install 
a government that is able to provide the democratic processes and security in 
order for a free market to develop.  The other side believes building a free market 
system and international trade will lead to a government that is democratically 
focused due to the demands of society.  By exploring the Palestinian Authority 
and Israeli economies as they relate to each other, we will be able to see if 
capitalist peace theory is applicable to the current status of the prospects for a 
peaceful resolution.  
Could development of a free market under the control of the Palestinian 
Authority with the principles of the Washington Consensus, responsibly 
implemented, lead to a lasting and secure two-state solution?  Would 
consolidation of regional economic integration enhance the prospects for peace 
within the Middle East North Africa (MENA) region? How might this be explained 
to Israel and its Arab neighbors? 
This section will look at the Palestinian Authority through the same lens as 
any other state even though the Palestinians do not exist as a state.  However, 
they have governmental institutions, hold elections, and have an economy that 
can be used to compare consumption and defense spending.  By exploring the 
two spectrums of capitalist peace theory in greater detail, this thesis hopes to 
explain why it would or would not work in these conditions. While economics are 
independent of the security considerations for a two-state solution and only play 
a minor role in the IPB analysis, the structure and capability of the economy will 
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greatly assist with a stable environment or prevent real peace from materializing.  
The Palestinian economy must have access to markets outside Israel to give it 
the ability to compete on a global market, in turn giving it the ability to lower 
unemployment and meet the demands of Palestinian society. There can be no 
lasting security without a developed Palestinian economy that gives its citizens 
the ability for advancement. The IPB analysis in Chapter VI will complement the 
analysis from this chapter and lead to the conclusion that Palestinian economic 
development is critical to greater security and long-term peace.  Achieving this 
will require Palestine to have autonomy and direct control of its markets and 
ability to get goods to the world market.  Israeli security of the West Bank runs in 
opposition to this view, taking short-term security requirements as the first 
priority.  Palestinian eventual control of its borders is necessary for its economic 
growth.   
According to Rafael Reuveny, the Israeli-Palestinian economic relations 
debate centers on three positions within the capitalist peace construct: first, 
integration; second, partial integration; and third, economic separation.  The 
integration view holds that both sides will have mutual benefits leading to closer 
ties and preventing violent reaction. It also argues that separating the two 
economies would have dire consequences to the Palestinians.  The partial 
integration view believes the two economies are not compatible, which is causing 
an imbalance in the relationship.  The supporters of the separation view warn 
that any other model will continue a balance in favor of Israel, thus perpetuating 
Palestinian dependence.88  
Arguing for free market and integration, Charles Boehmer and David 
Sobek say “developed states, are more reliant on services for their economic 
growth, are less likely to push territorial claims, and decrease their involvement in 
interstate conflict.  Meanwhile, the poorest states, although they have more to 
gain through territorial expansion, have a decreased ability to pursue their 
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objectives through military force.”89 Erik Gartzke, along with Stephen Brooks, 
supports this view: free markets have the power to unite two economies for the 
mutual benefit of greater security and economic growth through Regional Trade 
agreements.90 “Free markets have the potential to free states from the looming 
prospect of recurrent warfare.  Capitalism encourages cooperation among states 
by creating conditions that make war unappealing or unnecessary.  Free markets 
create another venue to competition among countries, often containing minor 
conflicts below the level of military force.”91 
Arguing for partial integration, both Jacob Metzer and Rafael Reuveny 
counter the integration view and believe the best approach for a stable peaceful 
economy is the second approach, “a dual economic approach that permits 
interaction among the units while highlighting the dimensions that separate 
them.”92 
Arguing for separation of the two economies, Arie Arnon and Sara Roy 
believe that since 1967 the Israeli policy towards Palestine is one of de-
development, which prevents a separate, distinct political Palestinian entity from 
establishing.  They point to this policy as evidence that any form of integration 
will continue to undercut any ability of the Palestinian economy from growing.93 
The standard capitalist peace theory and integration will not work between 
Israel and Palestine.  One major premise of the capitalist peace theory is that the 
two or more economies that integrate for greater economic cooperation are 
mutually developed, can individually more or less stand on their own, and each 
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country is considered an equal partner.  Israel is a developed economic 
powerhouse; Palestine is undeveloped and is hampered from developing due to 
both inside and outside influences.  Due to the imbalance between the levels of 
development in each economy, capitalist peace theory is not applicable in this 
situation.  In order for capitalist peace theory to be applicable and integration 
between Israel and Palestine to occur, there must be a period of separation that 
allows Palestine to develop and become an equal economic partner. 
A. ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
Stephen Brooks in his book, Producing Security, postulates that 
multinational corporations (MNC) act as a stabilizing force between nations and 
help unite them through economic means.  He argues that the MNCs build a 
network that creates an environment of inter-dependency between nations, thus 
making it less likely they will go to war against each other.  This environment can 
only be created in developed nations who participate in economic globalization.  
Non-developed nations have not participated in globalization, have very little 
means to do so, and lack the ability to develop the institutions and economy that 
would be attractive for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI).  Brooks concludes, “that 
while the geographic dispersion of multinational corporations (MNC) production is 
stabilizing among the great powers, it will not promote peace elsewhere in the 
world.”94   
Brooks also considers the growth of a second type of institution. Regional 
trade agreements (RTA) help lead to security and cooperation between two or 
more nations.  These agreements help a collection of nations to attract FDI that 
they could not do otherwise on their own.  The agreement helps bring together 
resources, manpower, and technology with fewer trade barriers. Brooks states 
that simply establishing an RTA does not improve security, rather, it is the 
consolidation of the nations involved.  For an RTA to be successful, true 
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integration with key dynamics must take place, “an enhanced network of 
transactions between citizens; deeper links of communication between 
policymakers; the creation of strong economic ties; spillover from dense 
economic cooperation to security cooperation; or a shift toward a more collective 
sense of interests.”95  These dynamics are not likely to develop under the current 
conditions with Israel and Palestine. The economic balance favors Israel too 
much for fair trade to develop between the two economies.  
Both the use of MNCs and RTAs as a method to help create security 
cooperation through economic means assumes that the nations involved are 
relatively equally developed, have similar economies, and are equal partners.  
Due to the imbalance of the economies between Israel and Palestine these two 
methods will not work and ,in fact, if attempted will perpetuate violent protests 
against integration.  Rafael Reuveny expands on this idea of imbalance and 
argues, “Least Developed Country (LDC’s) economic dependence generates 
forces that act to eliminate its own existence, as the dependent country becomes 
obsessed with breaking the dominating link.”96  To further understand the 
imbalance between the two nations we must look at their economic structures 
and trade policies as they relate to each other. 
The Palestinian economy is currently controlled by Israel.  Palestine is 
incapable of running its own institutions and developing a robust economy 
without the aid and approval of Israel.  George Abed argues, “External trade and 
capital movements between the occupied territories and the Arab countries were 
severely restricted and replaced by free Israeli access to the territories’ markets.  
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markets (including Israel) stunted agricultural growth while Israel’s administrative 
powers (such as its licensing authority) were used to suppress industrial 
development.”97 
Imbalance in the Palestinian economy suffers from the lack of 
development of manpower, infrastructure collapse, lack of access to Arab 
markets and is characteristically a dependent relationship with Israel.  This 
imbalance is enforced by Israel as a method for ensuring a more peaceful 
coexistence.  If Palestine does not have the resources to wage war, then they will 
be relegated to a less violent armed struggle.  If this assumption is correct, one 
must ask, does a weak Palestinian economy prevent violence or perpetuate it?   
According to The Heritage Foundation, in 2008, the last year data was 
collected for the West Bank and Gaza, the per capita income was $2,900 while 
the latest figures for Israel in 2010 per capita income was $28,393.98,99   In 
addition, as of 2008 figures, unemployment in the Palestinian territory is 26 
percent while in Israel it is 6.2 percent.100  This imbalance, coupled with 
desperate living conditions, leaves little alternative for Palestinians to coexist with 
Israel, and instead push for violent protest against the structures of their 
economic dependency on Israel.   
Under the Oslo accords, through the land for peace initiative, Palestine 
would receive greater autonomy on the condition of ending violence. Yasser 
Arafat and the Palestinian Authority were placed under immense pressure from 
Israel to reign in militant attacks. At the same time, rebellion by his constituents, 
over the fear that the Palestinian Authority had become nothing more than an 
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operational arm of Israeli security, sparked a cycle of support and violent protest 
to the Oslo peace process.101 This cycle of support and violence made the peace 
process unattainable.  
In 1994, an agreement was reached on economic compromise at the 
Paris Protocol.  The protocol was to give Palestine an independent trade policy 
and greater access to Israeli labor and markets.  In effect, Palestine was given a 
chance to build their own economy outside the direct influence of Israel.  
Implementation of the Paris Protocol stalled due to lengthening of the 
negotiations and a response by Israel to violence by extremists. 102  Instead of an 
opening of economic relations, Palestinians saw their economy under tighter 
control due to the collapse of the peace negotiations and the start of the second 
intifada. According to George Abed, Israel’s use of “occupation policies and 
practices have had the effect of generally directing all resource exploitation 
activities to accommodate Israel’s geopolitical requirements.”103 
The Palestinian Territories were, until quite recently, practically 
incorporated into Israel, and therefore, could not trade with other 
countries in the region.  The only exception was Jordan, which 
allowed some imports from the West Bank and Gaza, and exported 
a few goods to the Palestinian Territories in the token quantities 
allowed by Israel, which did not exceed one percent of all 
Palestinian imports in recent years.  Although the Israeli trade 
regime also applied to them, exports of farm produce from the West 
Bank and Gaza to Israel were severely restricted by administrative 
means.  The extensive discretionary powers held by the Israeli 
military authorities often were used to prevent the establishment of 
industrial plants by Palestinians that would have competed with 
existing Israeli firms.  The uncertainty regarding the political future 
of these territories and Jordanian restrictions on competing 
Palestinian imports greatly restricted the production of goods that 
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might have been exported to either Israel or Jordan and, hence, 
limited the trade of the Palestinian Territories with these 
countries.104  
B. ECONOMIC SEPARATION 
Capitalist peace theory of integration is not working in Israel and Palestine 
due to the imbalance in development and the restrictiveness in nature of Israeli 
economic policy towards Palestinian territory.  Another approach must be 
attempted, one of separation that gives room for a Palestinian state to develop.  
Only when Palestine’s economy is developed, globalized and similar to Israel will 
the use of MNCs and or RTAs be effective and hopefully bring the two nations to 
a true and lasting peace. Rafael Reuveny argues separation “will decrease 
Palestinian vulnerability to Israeli policies, thereby reducing Israel’s ability (and 
drive) to influence Palestinian policies.”105  A Palestinian government able to 
deter Israeli punitive measures will gain in public support, weaken Hamas’ 
support, and create the room for institutional building.  Hamas builds its support 
on the ability to provide welfare services that the Palestinian Authority is 
incapable of providing due to the weak economic structure.  A strong economy 
under the Palestinian Authority weakens Hamas and their extremist ideals and 
gives the Palestinian Authority the credibility to run the government and provide 
for its citizens.106 Katherine Barbieri summarizes the conclusion on the situation 
between Israel and Palestine.  “Economic linkages have a dramatic influence on 
whether or not dyads engage in militarized disputes, but no influence on the 
occurrence of wars.  Rather than inhibiting conflict, extensive economic inter-
dependence increases the likelihood that dyads will engage in militarized 
interstate disputes.  Peace through trade is most likely to arise among dyads 
composed of mutually dependent trading partners.”107 
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One key factor why it is important for there to be a period of economic 
separation is due to the growing imbalance in economic types. The top four 
Palestinian economic sectors are: first, agriculture and fisheries, of which the 
share of GDP in this sector is dropping due to land issues and water right 
restrictions and is at 4.8 percent of the 2009 GDP; second, mining, water, and 
electricity, has stayed relatively at the same share of GDP from 2008 to 2009, at 
14.7 percent; third, construction, which grew in 2009 to 7.4 percent; and fourth, 
the service sector, by far-and-away the largest sector at 38.2 percent of GDP.108 
These sectors are underdeveloped and show a low level of technological 
advance.  Palestine is unable to compete in the world economy and is dependant 
on Israel with 90 percent of its exports and 70 percent of its imports going to and 
coming from Israel.109 According to CIA world fact book, Palestine’s GDP in 2009 
was $12.79 billion.110 
In comparison, Israel’s economy is developed well beyond Palestine, 
Israel’s GDP is 16 times larger than Palestine’s at $206.4 billion.111 While Israel 
boasts a robust agriculture sector, construction, and public sector, Israel is also 
greatly diversified and modernized. According to Alan Richards and John 
Waterbury in their book, A Political Economy of the Middle East, “Israel has gone 
the farthest in the development and sophistication of its military industries.  
Israel’s technical expertise is without equal in the region.”112 
 
 
                                            
108  The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, Overview of the Palestinian 
Economy The Palestine Economic Policy Research Institute, 2010), http://www.pic-
palestine.ps/userfiles/file/pdfs/invest_in_palestine_en.pdf. 
109  Ron Pundak, The Untapped Potential: Palestinian-Israeli Economic Relations: Policy 
Options and Recommendations (Israel: Paltrade, the Palestine Trade Center, Peres Center for 
Peace, 2006), http://www.peres-center.org/The%20untapped%20Potential.pdf. 
110  CIA, The World Factbook: West Bank. 
111  The Heritage Foundation, 2011 Index of Economic Freedom: Israel. 
112  Richards and Waterbury, A Political Economy of the Middle East, 355. 
 60
The appropriate economic peace model to apply when there is a gap 
between a developed and undeveloped nation is separation.  Until two nations 
mutually respect each other and can work in an environment of collaboration, 
then and only then can the principles of economy peace theory build the bonds 
that prevent war. 
 61
IV. PALESTINIAN SECURITY FORCES 
Lasting peace between Israel and Palestine will require more than a 
secure environment with both groups free from fear; it will require an attitude of 
cooperation and partnership to ensure the relationship remains peaceful.  Under 
the Oslo accords, Israeli and Palestinian security institutions worked with each 
other while the CIA provided the bridge for cooperation, training, and trust.  
These relationships ultimately fell apart due to an inability to develop common 
objectives, loyalty to rule-of-law, common training practices, or an ability to 
communicate effectively.  A successful two-state solution requires a stable 
environment for peace to develop that is only brought about through professional, 
well-trained and equipped security institutions that can work with each other for a 
common goal.  This common goal is an agreed-upon agenda by the leadership of 
each nation and must be rigorously protected from competing ideas, with 
oversight to ensure goals are met. This chapter and the following one will begin 
with the start of Oslo, exploring the Israeli and Palestinian security institutions.  
By exploring their mission, the ideology governing the motivations and loyalties in 
each institution, and lastly, the professionalism and training of each security 
force, this thesis will identify Israeli failure in adjusting to the correct method for 
counterinsurgency operations, as well as the difficulties the Palestinian Authority 
faces with building a national security force that is loyal to the rule-of-law and one 
the population will trust to turn to in a time of need.  The IPB analysis generated 
in the last chapter looks at the technical aspects and limitations of security, and 
the next two chapters will attempt to bridge the social connection gap in this 
analysis. It is combining the social science analysis and the IPB analysis that 
gives the greatest understanding. 
Palestinian structures within the security institutions prevent a modern 
government capable of governing through the rule-of-law from developing, 
simultaneously preventing both the Palestinian and Israeli populations from 
placing increased confidence in Palestinian security. A defined border is the first 
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step in changing the Palestinian identity from revolution to national pride.  
Nationalism can only come about with a definition of the state, and this 
nationalism leads to a confidence in the system, which reinforces the security 
structures to work within the oversight of the legislative body and civil authority. 
A. PALESTINIAN SECURITY OVERVIEW 
Paragraph Three of Article III, in the Gaza-Jericho Agreement establishes 
the structure and composition of the Palestinian Police.  The force structure 
consists of four branches: Civil Police, Public Security, Intelligence, and 
Emergency Services and Rescue.  Each of the four security services is to report 
to the district authority within their respective districts.  The district authority in 
turn is to report to a national civilian control authority, with the Palestinian 
Authority President providing direct oversight. The total force for all Palestinian 
Police is not to exceed 9,000.113 The agreement was designed to give the 
Palestinian state the ability to start policing its own population without Israel 
fearing the creation of a hostile army within its boundaries of responsibility.   
The Oslo Accords expanded from the Gaza-Jericho Agreement, laying the 
ground rules and guiding principles to establishing peace and security.  Under 
these accords, Palestine was to create a centralized police force that was 
capable of providing security once Israeli military redeployed.  Paragraph C 
under sub section C Withdrawal and Redeployment in Section two: Security 
Issues of the Protocol on Withdrawal of Israeli Forces From the Gaza Strip and 
Jericho Area states, “Arrangements for the assumption of internal security and 
public order by the Palestinian police force consisting of police officers recruited 
locally and from abroad holding Jordanian passports and Palestinian documents 
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issued by Egypt. Those who will participate in the Palestinian police force coming 
from abroad should be trained as police and police officers.”114 
To accomplish this task, as well as provide control for the Palestinian 
Authority, Yasser Arafat went beyond the agreement and created twelve different 
security institutions.  These institutions held overlapping jurisdictions while 
operating in the West Bank and Gaza.115 “Instead of relying upon a unified 
command headed by a director general as stipulated in the Gaza-Jericho 
Agreement, or delegating supervisory powers to a minister of the interior, Arafat 
formed in 1994 the Supreme Council for National Security (SCNS).”116 “The 
Council was considered relatively inefficient in providing coordination, guidance 
and unity of command.”117  In 1994, the total number of security personnel was 
10,000; by 1997, the security force quadrupled in size to 42,000.118,119 According 
to an article by Reuters in 2008, entitled, U.S. Sees Palestinian forces needing 
billions in aid, the force will ultimately reach 50,000.120  Why did Arafat expand 
the security forces beyond the agreement?  To answer this question, first we 
must understand the structure of the PLO to see why it was necessary for Arafat 
to create so many institutions. 
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B. THE PALESTINIAN LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (PLO) 
The PLO was created as a way to unite multiple Palestinian movements 
into one focus of effort, to cut down on competition for resources, and to create a 
Palestinian identity.  While the PLO is a political organization, its leaders have 
direct impact on the structure, purpose, and loyalty of the security institutions 
within the Palestinian Authority. To provide structure and allow each Palestinian 
movement a voice, the Palestinian National Council (PNC) was created. 
“Although the number frequently changes, at last count the PNC had 430 
members, representing various segments of the Palestinian community, including 
armed militias and terrorist organizations.”121 While each organization is a 
member of the PLO, they have their own leadership, funding, and agenda.  They 
choose to adhere to the direction of the PLO as long as it suits their goals.  The 
position of Chairman was created to oversee the day-to-day operations of the 
PLO and give guidance and direction for the organization as well as keep the 
movement from fracturing. Without Yasser Arafat, it is likely the movement would 
have collapsed.  The security of the position of the Chairman rests on the 
continuous loyalty of the various movements and components.  While the 
chairman is voted into position, the individual movements and components are 
free to follow as they desire. Their loyalty to the chairman is gained more through 
patronage and continued agreement of vision rather than through authority given 
for a period of time through a vote or through fealty given for a lifetime.  
According to Neil Livingstone, “If enough component organizations sever their 
ties to the PLO or choose, for a period of time, not to recognize the leadership of 
the chairman and his allies, they can have a profound impact on the direction and 
policies of the PLO.”122  At the same time, however, it was Yasser Arafat who 
held the PLO together.  If he lost enough support from other movements, the 
Palestinians would be even more divided on their approach for achieving the 
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desire of a homeland. On September 13, 1993 Yasser Arafat as the Chairmen for 
the PLO, on the White House lawn, signed the Oslo Accords, officially making 
him responsible for security in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  Competing 
expectations put him in an impossible position.  The West expected Yasser 
Arafat to abide by security force structure as laid out in the agreement, while 
internal PLO politics forced him to find ways to accommodate competing rivals 
and keep the Palestinians united.  
According to Brynjar Lia in A Police Force without a State, “self-policing by 
non-state actors in a hostile environment is an almost impossible mission, as 
guerrilla warfare and its requirements prevent the rise of permanent institutions 
with physical infrastructure.”123 The PLO had the task of transitioning its militancy 
groups into a cohesive security force.  Individual loyalties were given to an 
organization dedicated to the revolutionary creation of a Palestinian homeland.  
Oslo expected individual loyalties to be given to rule-of-law under the Palestinian 
Authority, a not yet fully recognized state capable of employing a monopoly of 
force over its own citizens.  For decades individual identities were tied to the 
revolutionary movement and Palestinian land. The West expected identity to be 
based on Nationalism and a secular democratic governmental system. 
“Palestinian self-policing also included tribal or customary mechanisms of 
adjudication and enforcement of social order, based on kinship or village 
allegiances.”124 For an individual to abandon their loyalty of the organization or 
movement they were a member of, and pledge their loyalty to a system that was 
still in the making and had no guarantee of being recognized by the international 
community as the Palestinian state, was tantamount to turning their backs on 
their own identity. 
The key to transitioning the security force identity and loyalty from a 
revolution movement to a state system is to undercut the need for a revolution. In 
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this case the establishment of the state serves as the objective of the revolution, 
an accomplishment thus ending the need for a revolution. Only when there is a 
true Palestinian state can a transition start to achieve the desired results of 
unified identity in a governmental system and, in turn, result in belief in the rule-
of-law.  
The Bush administration on April 30, 2003, along with the UN, EU, and 
Russia, known as the “quartet” in an attempt to put the peace process back on 
track, established the roadmap; it is under these guidelines that the obligations 
for each side currently exist. The roadmap is a three-phase performance-based 
plan to stop the violence and bring the two sides back to the negotiating table 
and put the process back on track with the Oslo Agreement. “Currently, there are 
five separate organizations that constitute the Palestinian Authority Security 
Forces (PASF): the National Security Forces (which includes an autonomous 
military intelligence branch), the Palestinian Civil Police, the Preventive Security 
Organization, the Presidential Guard, and the General Intelligence Service.”125  
These are the institutions this thesis will explore in greater detail. 
Corruption is affecting security agreements and institutions within the 
Palestinian security structure.  Due to the rampant corruption within the Fatah 
and PLO, Hamas won the 2006 elections.  Hamas’ victory resulted in a change to 
power sharing within Palestine as well as control of security forces. During the 
2006 election, Hamas directed the campaign towards social issues, just 
resistance against Israel, and anti corruption.126 Fatah attempted to acknowledge 
corruption within the ranks but blamed the conditions set by Israel as the 
cause.127 It is the corruption within the Palestinian leadership that helped give 
Hamas greater power and, in turn, gave them control of the security institutions in 
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the Gaza Strip that led to a coup in June 2007, thus changing the Israeli security 
calculus and views of the Palestinian Authority as a viable partner for peace. 




Figure 3.   PA Security Organizations and Command Structure128 
C. NATIONAL SECURITY FORCES (NSF) 
The National Security Force (Al-Amn al-Watani) is the largest of all the 
Palestinian Authority security institutions.  Academic literature shows the size of 
the force in 1997 between 16,500–18,000, with a Congressional Research 
Service report dated January 2010, placing the current force structure at 
8,000.129,130,131 It is structured around a military style and serves in the capacity 
of a gendarmerie-type force while supporting civil police.132  The NSF is currently 
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commanded by Diab al Ali, who describes the mission of the NSF as, “We’re 
building a force to defend our people, and also to help the Palestinians build a 
nation.”133 Before Hamas took over Gaza, its officer core was recruited from 
Palestinians living outside Palestine mainly in Jordan and Egypt, while its rank 
and file were recruited from within the West Bank and Gaza Strip.134 Its area of 
responsibility covers “policing outside the cities, public order maintenance, 
patrolling along the borders of Area A (see Figure 4). As the most army-like 
branch, it was the body most deeply involved in the September, 1996, clashes 
when the Palestinian Police engaged the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) in pitched 
gun battles.”135 
After the Al-Aqsa intifada in 2000, the Israeli military control authority 
would not allow the NSF to operate due to security concerns to its own citizens 
and settlers in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  However, with the implementation 
of the November, 2007, Annapolis Agreement, the force was reconstituted, and 
funding for training was provided from the United States International Narcotics 
Control and Law Enforcement program (INCLE).136  In 2009, the United States 
Congress appropriated $184 million to develop a security force capable of 
providing basic security services within Palestinian controlled areas in the West 
Bank after the departure of IDF soldiers.137  The training program is run through 
the office of the United States Security Coordinator (USSC), currently headed by 
General Dayton through 2010.138 The training is provided by an international 
team of contractors and consists of an “intense 1,400-hours of instruction 
specifically called for in the curriculum for human rights law, defensive tactics, 
first aid, urban and rural small-unit tactics, firearms, mounted and foot-patrol 
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techniques, and crime scene investigations.”139  The recruits are vetted through 
various databases in Washington, Israel Security Agency, Shin Bet, Israel Police, 
and the Jordanian government for any criminal activity or terrorist 
associations.140 The training is located at the Jordan International Police Training 
Centre (JIPTC).  By the end of 2009, five battalions completed the training, 
totaling 2,600 men, with another 1,000 expected to complete the training by the 
end of 2010.141 See Table 2 for a breakdown in units trained. “General Dayton 
envisions ten NSF battalions can be trained in Jordan, one for each of the nine 








Feb-Mar 2008 400 
NSF 1st Dec 2009 500 
NSF 2nd Feb-May 2008 700 
NSF 3rd Sep-Dec 2008 500 
NSF 4th Feb-Jun 2009 500 
NSF 5th 2010 500 
NSF 6th 2010 500 
Total, 7 Battalions Total, 3 years Total, 3,600 
Table 2.   Palestinian Security Force Trained by the United States143 
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D. PALESTINIAN CIVIL POLICE (PCP) 
The Civilian Police (al-shurtah), came into existence in May 1994, with a 
handful of trained officers from exile. “Headed by an experienced police officer, 
Brigadier Ghazi al-Jabali, who in contrast to the leaders of the other branches 
was not a former guerrilla, a street fighter or a PLA general, the Civilian Police 
grew into one of the largest and most important branches.”144 It is estimated in 
1997 to have a force size of 10,500 with 4,000 in the Gaza Strip and the 
remaining 6,500 in the West Bank.  According to Jane’s Sentinel Security 
Assessment, the force strength in May 2010, of the PCP was around 7,300 
personnel.145 The PCP is trained for riot control, traffic police, criminal 
investigations, and anti-drug ops.146,147 “An important sub-branch was the Public 
Order and Rapid Intervention Unit, which was established in January, 1995, and 
expanded to a relatively professional force of about a thousand men by late 
1996.”148  The PCP received training from the British and the Dutch through the 
European Union (EU) assistance programs; however, the assistance was 
suspended after Hamas won the election in 2006.149  The training was halted 
because of the fear that the EU would be arming and training a terrorist 
organization.  
The Civilian Police had a special Female Police Department with 
about 350 policewomen in 1997, headed by Colonel Fatima 
Barnawi. They were also employed at checkpoints and border 
crossings where searches of female individuals required their 
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presence, in female prisons or during the apprehension of women. 
Female officers were found mostly in the Civilian Police, but a small 
number were also employed in other branches, including the GIS, 
the PSA and the PNSF.150 
E. PREVENTIVE SECURITY ORGANIZATION (PSO) 
The Preventive Security Organization (jihaz al-amn al-waqa'i) is a special 
plain-clothes unit styled after the FBI with loyalty to Fatah. Prior to Hamas’ coup 
in December 2007, the organization was two separate organizations located in 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.  One of its primary missions is to deal with 
dissident Palestinian organizations, such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.151 In 
the mid 90s the PSO was run by two outspoken figures with political ambitions 
and they were part of the reason Arafat structured the institutions in such a way 
as to ensure no one leader of a security institution gained too much power and 
authority. However, “the PSO reportedly controlled a number of import-export 
monopolies, which invited hard-to-refute charges of economic corruption and 
malfeasance.”152 
“Being the only truly homegrown inside-based police branch, the PSO 
commanded considerable respect and credibility on the Palestinian 'street', as 
nearly all its officers had been jailed by Israel for security offences.”153 The last 
reliable figures placed the size of the force between 3,000 and 5,000 prior to the 
Al-Aqsa intifada in 2000. The PSO participated in the security coordination with 
Israel over exchange of intelligence. 
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F. PRESIDENTIAL GUARD (PG) 
The Presidential Guard is an elite unit with roots in Fatah’s guerrilla forces 
from the 60s and later transformed into Force-17 in March 1990, and merged 
with Presidential Security (PS) in November 1993.154 Force-17 was a commando 
style militant group established in the 70s and was loyal to the Chairman of the 
PLO. Its mission is to protect the Palestinian President, VIPs, and important PA 
facilities and officials.  In June 1994 a “PS/Force-17 commander, Colonel 'Adil 
Salih, resigned in protest after an armed confrontation in the West Bank between 
his forces and the more powerful PSA. The West Bank departments of the 
Presidential Security were temporarily closed down in order to restore order, and 
some 27 PS/Force-17 members were jailed for indiscipline.”155 
Under Yasser Arafat the PG styled itself similar to the “Republican Guard,” 
centered in Gaza City. “Its armored units deployed throughout Gaza and in the 
West Bank cities in the aftermath of several suicide bombings in February-March, 
1996, to enforce the martial law declared by the PNA.”156 As of May 2010, the 
force strength is around 2,300, divided into four battalions, and reports directly to 
the Palestinian President through the Minister of the Interior. The Presidential 
Guard 3rd battalion received Palestinian Security Force Training from the United 
States. 
G. GENERAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (GIS) 
The General Intelligence Service is a combination of various intelligence 
organizations that were merged in late November 1993, after Oslo. The two main 
agencies, the Unified Security Agency, directed primarily by Colonel aI-Hindi was 
merged with the Central Intelligence, headed by Hakam Bal'awi, a wealthy 
businessman, a Fatah Central Committee member, the PLO's ambassador to 
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Tunisia and widely considered to be the head of the PLO's internal security.”157  
A tripartite leadership of Amin al-Hindi, Tariq Abu Rajab and Fakhri Shaffurah, 
ran the new GIS. “In September 2009, Major General Majid Faraj was appointed 
head of the service, a long-time activist who has spent six years in Israeli 
prisons.”158  At the time of the merger in 1993, the organization consisted of 
around 800 experienced intelligence officers mainly from Tunis, but grew to 
3,500 by 1997 with 1,500 in Gaza and 2,000 in the West Bank.159 
The mission and responsibility of the GIS is to arrest suspected terrorists 
and dissidents who oppose the Palestinian Authority.  It is also responsible for 
the collection of intelligence both within the Palestinian territory as well as from 
foreign countries.  It is the primary interface with foreign intelligence services and 
reports directly to the Palestinian President.160  
H. GAZA STRIP SINCE 2007 
Until December 2007, security was the responsibility of the Palestinian 
Authority.  In an attempt to assert its authority and control within the Gaza Strip, 
Hamas successfully conducted a coup against the Palestinian Authority. The 
security institutions in the Gaza Strip fell to Hamas along with all their equipment 
and resources.  Hamas was able to outfit a small army with the weapons and 
ammunition they seized from the security forces. While Hamas has created 
security organizations, there is little understanding of the current force structure 
and capabilities in the academic literature.  Analysis of Hamas’ security 
institutions is outside the scope of this thesis, as any relevancy of these security 
institutions will only be valid when Hamas is brought in line with a two-state 
solution, something Hamas is actively working against. If a two-state solution is 
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to be successful, the Gaza Strip, specifically Hamas, either needs to abandon its 
call for the destruction of Israel and re-unite with the Palestinian Authority, falling 
under its security structures, or it needs to be isolated from the solution and be 
dealt with in a separate manner. 
I. POLICE REFORM 
For police reform to be successful, Rama Mani in his article, 
Contextualizing Police Reform: Security, the Rule-of-law and Post-Conflict 
Peacebuilding, argues a de-linking between the military and the police must take 
place to clearly define the roles that each institution plays in providing for the 
security of its nation.161 
The need for clearly delineating the distinction between the roles 
and doctrines of the police and military and making a radical 
separation between the two institutions in the transition to peace 
was recognized by peacemakers as early as 1990-92 in the context 
of EI Salvador's lengthy peace negotiations. The El Salvadoran 
Peace Agreement specified: 
The doctrine of the armed forces is based on a distinction between 
the concepts of security and defense. National defense, the 
responsibility of the armed forces, is intended to safeguard 
sovereignty and territorial integrity against outside military threat. 
Security, even when it includes this notion, is a broader concept 
based on unrestricted respect for the individual and social rights of 
the person. It includes, in addition to national defense, economic, 
political and social aspects, which go beyond the constitutional 
sphere of the armed forces and are the responsibility of other 
sectors of society and of the state.  
The maintenance of internal peace, tranquility, order and public 
security lies outside the normal functions of the armed forces... 
[who] play a role in this sphere only in very exceptional 
circumstances, where the normal means have been exhausted.162 
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J. DISCUSSION  
In Palestine, the separation between the two spheres of security is 
exceptionally difficult. While the need for the transition to occur is critical for the 
establishment of a Palestinian state, to give up the military aspect of national 
security is equivalent to giving up on the revolution and one’s identity as a 
Palestinian.  The Palestinian identity is directly tied to the land and the 
Revolutionary movement of establishing a Palestinian homeland. Without a 
recognized Palestinian state, all security forces will retain an associated identity 
of militancy to one day establish a state.  As long as this condition persists, any 
Palestinian security force will not be able to make the transition into a legitimate 
police force solely focused on internal security and will remain a potential threat 
to Israel’s security.  True and lasting peace will only come when Palestine is 
allowed to change the revolution into nationalism and pride for the state they 
desire. With the security institutions divided, along with a lack of real central 
authority pulling them together, combined with the analysis of the IPB chapter, 
this thesis can conclude that the way the West Bank was broken up into three 
areas of control was a detriment to developing peace. The intent of the Oslo 
accords was to give room for Palestine to develop its police force into a cohesive 
unit, however, the geographical division prevented coordination, unity of effort, or 
the development of a professional force.  The better approach would be to 
determine the borders first with no ambiguity of territorial control at the 
completion of Israeli withdrawal. In addition, all Palestinian territory should fall 
under what the Oslo accords called as area B, Palestinian autonomy with Israeli 
conducting joint security patrols, and over time Israeli presence lessen and 




Figure 4.   The West Bank and Jerusalem under Oslo 2, Showing Areas A, B, C 
as Controlled by Israel and Palestine163 
 
                                            





V. ISRAELI SECURITY 
A. ISRAELI SECURITY OVERVIEW 
Understanding Israel’s security needs as they relate to its internal 
concerns, as well as internally with the Palestinians, requires knowing the focus 
and mission of each branch of service, how they relate to each other, and their 
relationships to civil-military institutions.  Israeli defense structure and equipment 
acquisition is based on its interpretation of the geographical threat.  Before 
analyzing the threat through the IPB process in the next chapter, it is first 
important to understand its counterterrorism approach.  The missions of the 
various Israeli security institutions cannot be mapped, but it is critical to 
understand them when considering alternative solutions to past peace process 
failures.  
The history of Israeli authority in Arab territories, how it is structured, and 
its policies are key to understanding the friction between the Israeli Defense 
Force (IDF), the Israeli civilian authorities, and between the Palestinians and the 
Israeli government. The governing body over the Arab territories meant to ensure 
security for Israeli citizens is the institution responsible for implementation of any 
agreement for a two-state solution.  If the governing authority is implementing an 
agenda other than the peaceful agenda of Israel’s Prime Minister, then no 
amount of talks and agreements will result in a two-state solution.  While the 
governing authority will say its foremost and primary mission is guaranteeing the 
safety and security of Israel citizens, while in a hostile environment, its approach 
of treating the Palestinian Authority as an enemy instead of a partner for peace is 
a primary reason why the conflict persists.  
At the end of the six-day war in 1967, Israel was faced with a dilemma: 
should they trade Arab territories for peace or maintain occupation? If they 
decided to occupy, how should they govern?  The newly acquired territories held 
over a million Arabs. What was Israel’s responsibility for their well-being as well 
 78
as security needs for the state of Israel?  Ultimately, Israel chose to occupy the 
territories and established the Military Government to administer the area. “The 
structure of the military government in each of the four occupied regions had a 
Military Governor enjoying full legislative and executive authority in the area.  The 
Military Governor is at the apex of the government within the district and operates 
under the law virtually as a head of state.”164 Within each governor’s staff, 
various Israeli ministries were represented to provide the full spectrum of 
governance. “Although these staff officers are professionally responsible to their 
parent ministries, they are also subject to the authority of the IDF's district military 
commander.”165  The relationship between the military and the agencies was 
complicated through the competing agendas of good governance and security.  
Within the military government the most important position is that of the 
coordinator. “He heads the military government division in the General Staff, and 
is the Chief of Staff's senior adviser on issues relating to the occupied territories. 
At the same time, he is head of the Defense Ministry's unit for the coordination of 
activities in the territories and responsible to the minister.”166  Because the 
position is responsible for the security within the territories, as well as 
governance, the IDF became a key figure within Israeli politics assisting with 
policy in regards to the Palestinian territories.  
“Although the IDF is undoubtedly subordinate to the democratically 
elected government, its exceptionally large influence over policy-making clearly 
deviates from Samuel Huntington’s model of ‘objective’ civilian control.”167  
Huntington clarifies his model in his book The Soldier and the State. “Objective 
civilian control must rely not on direct subordination of the military to civilian 
pressures but on a military ethic of professional expertise and political 
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neutrality.”168  The IDF had the monumental task of governing the territories 
while ensuring security; at times the two objectives clashed, always resulting in 
the priority given to security.  While this approach was necessary for the survival 
of Israel, it resulted in violations of human rights. The Israeli soldier on the street 
under command of the military governing authority became the epitome of 
everything the Palestinians hated and feared.  Israel’s military became an 
occupying force with an objective not to develop a lasting solution but to keep 
violence to a minimum.  Israeli objectives in the Arab territories are directly 
influenced by its relationship to its neighbors, fear of violence from Palestinians, 
and by posturing of the political parties within Israel.  
B. COUNTERTERRORISM/COUNTERINSURGENCY 
Israel is currently engaged in two types of counterterrorism strategies. 
First, in the West Bank, they are conducting direct engagement and policing 
while setting the conditions for nation building.  Second, in the Gaza Strip and 
partially along the Lebanon border, they are engaged in quarantine and reprisal 
attacks.  This split approach is attempting to deal with the objectives by the 
different Palestinian elements as they relate to Israeli security.  However, this 
approach may have unforeseen complications in trying to build a trusting 
relationship with any Palestinian representative.  
Before the current split approach, the Israeli government viewed all 
Palestinians as a problem and prescribed collective punishment for any violence.  
Contemporary wisdom on counterterrorism and counterinsurgency states that to 
end conflict one must integrate society into the political process, therefore 
undercutting the social support for radical elements. According to Stuart Cohen in 
a study about the Israeli army commissioned by Routledge, “It is generally 
agreed, the IDF’s counter-insurgency operations prior to the mid-1990s were 
noticeably inept.  Instead of making a coherent and concerted attempt to win 
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over “hearts and minds” in either southern Lebanon or the occupied territories, 
the IDF resorted to unimaginative roundups of what it termed “terrorists” and their 
affiliates, who it then corralled in enormous detention camps.”169  In a study 
aimed at identifying where the strategic focus of priorities for the IDF, Avi Kober 
compared the articles published in Ma’arachot, IDF’s principal public forum for 
discussing military matters, and found that between 1948 and 2000 only 3 
percent of the articles dealt with subconventional conflict while the overwhelming 
majority, at 94 percent, dealt with conventional warfare tactics.170 This seems to 
indicate by the lack of discussion, that as late as the year 2000, 13 years after 
the start of the first intifada, the IDF either refused to adapt its strategic objectives 
to counter an insurgency or it miss-identified the emerging threat.  Israel put 
considerable effort into the Oslo Accords through the 90s, however, its approach 
in dealing with radical elements that were opposed to the peace process, was 
one based on collective punishment.  It was the collective punishment tactics that 
contributed to a breakdown in relations between both peoples.   
Currently, the relationship between Israel and Palestine in the West Bank 
is starting to show signs of turning to incorporation into the political process, but 
with the backdrop of collective punishment, it will take years for Palestinians to 
see the Israelis as committed to a peaceful resolution that establishes a 
Palestinian state.  With Israel conducting collective punishment in the Gaza Strip, 
members of Fatah may be grateful that they are not in that situation but fear that 
conditions could change that would result in the isolation of the West Bank again. 
C. INTERNAL SECURITY 
The short history of Israel has had profound impact on the IDFs approach 
to dealing with an enemy threat.  The geography and conditions in which Israel 
gained its independence laid the foundation for institutional thinking as well as a 
national outlook of always being in a position of survive or die. The wars of ‘67 
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and ‘73 only served as reinforcements for this attitude with the Arab armies 
collectively marshalling against Israel.  When the Palestinian revolution resulted 
in two intifadas, which called for the destruction of Israel, there was no need to 
consider a different approach to dealing with what seemed to be a continuation of 
the same Arab problem.  Today’s counterinsurgency strategy of winning the 
hearts and minds is counterintuitive given the history and direct threat that violent 
actions by various Palestinian groups were perpetrating. To put down violent 
protests in both intifadas, the IDF rolled out the tried and true tactics of collective 
punishment, house demolitions, deportations, destruction of Palestinian 
infrastructure, small-scale expeditions by special forces, and large-scale 
incursions under control of the Palestinian Authority, to name a few.171 While 
these tactics are effective in limiting violence and establishing a relative 
temporary calm, it comes at a high cost, not just with blood and treasure, but also 
in terms of true and lasting security.   
By undercutting the Palestinian Authority and collectively punishing the 
Palestinians, it is more likely the Palestinians will continue to fight for 
independence rather than view Israel as a partner for peace who has earned 
their respect.  No matter how accommodating Israel could be, there will always 
be radical elements that will call for the destruction of Israel and are willing to 
sacrifice their lives and others to accomplish their goals.  But the mark of a good 
counterinsurgency strategy is finding a way that can foster a professionally 
mutually respected relationship between the two parties while isolating and 
targeting individual terrorists without compromising the majority’s sense of nation 
building. If a successful counterinsurgency strategy is found, the indigenous 
population is more likely to prevent radical elements of society from disrupting 
the prospects for peace. 
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D. CONVENTIONAL MILITARY 
Israel does not possess the largest military in the Middle East, but it does 
possess the most technologically advanced. The military’s first mission is to 
protect the nation from external forces, however, the military provides all the 
security in the West Bank and Gaza Strip under military rule.  The Israeli military 
is broken up into three arms: the Army, Navy, and Air Force.  The focus of this 
thesis is on internal security as it relates to the Palestinian issue: the important 
element in understanding the military is their counterterrorism approach and 
Security First.   
E. MASSAD 
Recognizing that the Massad plays a key role in the Israeli military 
government in the West Bank and understanding its importance with critical 
scholarly sources is difficult.  Most of the literature available rests in two areas. 
The first is the Palestinian perspective, of which there is no scholarly work and 
which is presented more like conspiracy theory. This criticism is not to degrade 
the feelings and perceptions that the Palestinians feel they endure under a 
secretive organization but rather to point to the need for further research and 
validation.  The second body of literature mainly comes from retired Massad 
agents as memoires from 1948 up until the late 80s.  Again, while this literature is 
important in its own respect, it provides one perspective of what the agent in 
question was tasked to complete and provides little insight into the policy, 
purpose, and mission of the Massad in the West Bank and Gaza Strip under the 
Oslo Accords. It is not surprising that finding the mission details and agenda of 
an Israeli intelligence organization at the unclassified level is difficult. Rather than 
engaging in speculative analysis this thesis will be content with acknowledging 





The differences in the security institutions between Israel and Palestine 
both at the individual level and at the policy level are profound.  Much work is 
needed to bridge the gap between the vision for peace and the tactics used to 
ensure security for both sides.  Israel’s policy of countering terrorism with group 
punishment, while effective at limiting violence, only serves to prolong the 
confrontation and prevent any application of a two-state solution process from 
materializing.  For there to be any success, Israel needs to adopt a 
counterinsurgency strategy that strengthens moderate elements of society and 
gives room for grievances in a political system and hope at the prospect of 
building a Palestinian nation.  
Israel’s military is unmatched in the region technologically and is unlikely 
to engage in a conventional state on state war for the foreseeable future.  
However, it is unable to eradicate all violent threats, indicating that while the 
military is key to providing security, its role and mission needs to be integrated 
into a diplomatic solution. 
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VI. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE 
(IPB) 
In my IPB analysis of the Israeli Palestinian security considerations for a 
two-state solution, I based my overlays on unclassified scientific data drawn from 
past geographical boundary agreements, current Israeli settlement locations, 
Israeli military closure areas, fresh water aquifers, Iranian missile and man 
portable air-defense system (manpad) ranges, roads, and terrain analysis. Each 
overlay relates directly to security either as a resource or geographic location 
needing protection and desired acquisition, or as a direct conventional threat. It is 
my intention to show what the Israeli intentions are in the West Bank, how even 
with current recommendations by David Makovsky of The Washington Institute 
for Near East Policy, Israel will face continued Palestinian opposition, and that 
the starting point for any peace negotiations must begin with a clearly identified 
border that both sides will recognize when the Palestinian state is created. 
What is IPB? An IPB is an analytical method employed by the United 
States military that analyzes geographic data to find strengths, weaknesses, 
capabilities, decision points, key infrastructure, lines of communication, best 
approaches for friendly forces as well as most likely approaches from enemy 
forces, resources, and strategic terrain, etcetera.172 Analysis is only limited to the 
creativity of the analyst, their capability to draw causal relationships, and 
availability of data that is geographically based. For example, an IPB can analyze 
the relationship of an aircraft’s capability with range of motion, its ordinance, and 
where it will cause the greatest amount of damage, but it can not take into 
account if the pilot will or will not drop a bomb.  
How is an IPB made? Starting with a map, a series of overlays is created 
on an electronic media like Google Earth.  Each overlay contains the specific 
data related to the geographical features of the chosen map. As more and more 
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overlays are built on top of each other, a snapshot in time will show the causal 
relationships begging to emerge and give a better understanding of the 
environment. Questions can begin to be answered such as why holding some 
terrain is more valuable than holding other terrain, what are the threats and 
capabilities of an enemy’s ability to affect defensive forces. Knowing this allows 
one to posture his forces with greater defense and efficiency. Knowing and 
understanding the strengths and capabilities of the defensive forces as well as 
the enemy forces in relationship to the environment gives one an advantage in 
making better, more informed decisions and hopefully creating the desired 
conditions.  
The maps and overlays used in this analysis were created by hand on 
Google Earth. In the interest of allowing others to recreate the same process and 
analyze for themselves, the overlays can be downloaded at 
https://sites.google.com/site/IsraelPalestinesecurity. Sourcing for the data used 
to create the overlays is the best unclassified data available and taken from 
unbiased sources. The data was translated into KLM format used by Google 
Earth and then was able to be displayed as an overlay. Some desired information 
is not available that would have helped with this analysis, for example, the 
location of all Israeli military bases, security checkpoints, and the availability of 
more potent weapons to Palestinians in the West Bank than small arms.  
One key assumption as a baseline for analyzing what the final borders for 
Israel and Palestine could be was one taken from David Makovsky’s analysis at 
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, a new proposal for Israeli 
Palestinian borders.  His work, while coming from a pro-Israeli organization, 
holds merit because it attempts to take geographic considerations into account 
for the proposal of a new border.  In his proposal, he offers five options. My 
analysis will use his Triangle Land Swap proposal because it gives the greatest 
amount of land to the Palestinians in exchange for Israeli settlements in the West 
 87
Bank.173  This border only represents a starting point and confines the analysis 
since it is impossible to predict at this time what the final border of a Palestinian 
state would look like since negotiations are on-going.  The other two possible 
starting points are to use the borders the Palestinians prefer from 1948 or what 
the Israelis typically use from 1967.  Using either of these lines as the final border 
for the two-state solution is unrealistic, as neither side would agree to the other’s 
demands on this issue. David Makovsky’s border represents the most current 
likely possibility given the current geographical demands for peace. 
Typically the analysis generated from an IPB is classified due to its 
identification of one’s opponent’s intentions as well as one’s own.  One of the 
arguments against peace negotiations is that by dragging them on, Israel is able 
to settle more and more land, thus expanding its borders and asserting their 
control over greater resources.  A second assumption is that Israel’s intention is 
to provide a security buffer between the Palestinians and their Arab neighbors. 
Palestinian intentions are unclear. Since 2006 Palestinian elections, the 
population has been divided between Fatah and Hamas each with a differing 
agenda towards Israel.  Because the society is divided, any arrangements 
agreed to beg the question of whether they can be applied to all Palestinian 
territories. The IPB process aspires to shed some light on the security issues that 
face both sides and allow better insight into why past deals were not acceptable 
and hopefully help future deals take into account these failures as well as offer 
better compromises.  
A. IPB ANALYSIS 
In 1948, Israel was broken into three main sections, one on the west side 
of the sea of Galilee, the second one along the coastal plains next to the 
Mediterranean, and the third in the southern desert reaching down to Eilat, (see 
Figure 5). The Palestinian land was to be the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and the 
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areas shaded in green.  In 1967, Israel pushed its borders out to what they are 
today, the red lines representing Palestinian territory minus Israeli settlements. It 
is the difference between the green shaded areas and the line drawn in 1967 that 
keeps any permanent borders from being agreed to.  It is also the green shaded 
areas that Palestinians are calling for their “right to return.” The maximalist view 
for Palestinians is to recover as much of the green area as possible, however, 
they have shown the desire to compromise and move the borders closer to the 
1967 line. At issue is the ability of the Palestinian Authority to promote any 
agreement to its constituents in a way that gives them the greatest security and 
autonomy, and guarantees that Israelis will honor the agreement. For Israelis, 
security from Palestinian acts of terrorism as well as safety from neighboring 
Arab armies are their first and primary concerns with any security arrangements 




Figure 5.   Map 1, Borders174,175,176,177,178 
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The white shaded areas within the West Bank are the Israeli military 
closure areas. According to Major General Uzi Dayan of the Israeli Defense 
force, “Defensible borders will provide the optimal topographical conditions for 
Israel’s active-duty forces to withstand a ground assault by numerically superior 
enemy forces while the mobilization of the reserves is completed.”179 Israel views 
this area as necessary for the defense against foreign threats, as well as 
necessary to maintain control to prevent weapons funneling into Palestinian 
territories. Israel maintains early warning stations in this area to give them time to 
react to any developing threat.180 These closure areas, and more specifically, the 
one that runs from the Dead Sea north continuously along the Jordan River is a 
way for Israel to maintain positive control of what material transits through the 
border.  This allows Israel to prevent illegal arms shipments into the West Bank 
as well as control the Palestinian economy. It is unlikely that Israel would be 
willing to negotiate on giving up this part of the West Bank unless substantive 
security measures were put in place that gave them confidence that Israel’s 
security could be maintained. As long as Israel maintains control along the 
Jordan River, Palestine’s autonomy will be in question.  A nation that does not 
have control of its own borders does not have control of its own territory, 
autonomy, or economy.  For Palestine to be a functioning state, it must be 
allowed to act with all the rights, privileges, and responsibilities of a state.  One 
idea that has been considered for separating the Israeli security forces from the 
Palestinians and giving Palestinians greater autonomy without the loss of 
security, is to introduce a third nation security force as the overseer for a 
transition period. While this concept has major problems and is an unlikely 
solution to lessening the security situation, it might be possible to employ a third-
nation security force along the Jordan River allowing the Israelis to depart the 
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eastern portion of the West Bank while still having security guarantees.  This type 
of arrangement has worked well in the Sinai Peninsula since 1981. As part of the 
Camp David Accords, the Multinational Force & Observers (MFO) was created to 
oversee and ensure the terms of the peace treaty were maintained.181 The issue 
of early warning could be dealt with as well.  If a third-party security force is 
employed along the West Bank and maintains early warning systems, they, in 
turn, can provide the data necessary to the Israelis, Jordanians, Palestinians, 
and other nations, if agreed to. By building a common radar picture that all can 
see, greater trust between neighbors could be built and security cooperation 
could lead to cooperation in other areas like economics. 
David Makovsky’s Triangle Land Swap proposal is an attempt to move 
80 percent of Israeli settlements in the West Bank directly under Israeli control 
and territory.182 He does a good job of defining a border along natural 
geographical features such as ridgelines and valleys. For their cooperation, the 
Palestinian Authority would recoup some lands where Palestinians are currently 
living under Israeli rule back into the West Bank.  The areas proposed are in the 
northwest portion of the West Bank, the southwest portion of the West Bank, and 
in an increase in the size of the Gaza Strip. See Figure 5 for differences between 
the 1967 line and the Triangle Land Swap proposal. 
Logically this makes sense. However, from a security perspective there 
are several issues at stake. First, the locations of the Israeli settlements are 
significant.  Looking individually at the settlements it is apparent that the 
settlements were selected not because the land was available and no one was 
living there, but rather, for two very specific reasons: the locations selected were 
of strategic importance and they occupied high ground.   Israeli settlements 
typically occupy the high ground overlooking Palestinian villages. The reason for 
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occupying the high ground allows the settlement to have the best defensible 
position. In addition, Israeli history points to the significance of occupying the 
high ground in the West Bank. 
One of the lasting scars from the Israeli war of independence of 1948 took 
place along the corridor from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. For five months before the 
British mandate ended in 1948, the Arab irregular forces occupied the high 
ground along the corridor, establishing a blockade.183 Running the blockade and 
getting supplies to Jerusalem became a source of national pride and 
encouragement in the face of opposition to the young Zionist movement.  Today, 
Israel maintains burned out shells of vehicles that were destroyed attempting to 
run the blockade as a memorial and a reminder of the lessons learned from their 
experience.  Israel learned early on that holding the high ground, occupying the 
villages around Jerusalem and the lines of communication are the keys to a 
strong defense. Israel applies these lessons by choosing strategic high ground in 
positioning its settlements in the West Bank. 
The second security problem with the Triangle Land Swap proposal is the 
sizable increase in the length of the border. In this proposal, the West Bank 
border length almost doubles in size. While the Israelis are more than capable of 
providing security along the length of the border, it would have some unintended 
effects on the Palestinian society. The road system and lines of communication 
in the West Bank, built by the Israelis, would fall in Israeli territory, isolating and 
severely limiting Palestinian movement.  From an antiterrorist perspective, this 
makes good sense.  However, from a desire to have peaceful neighbors, this 
perspective keeps tensions inflamed. Currently, Palestinians are not allowed to 
use the Israeli-built roads in the West Bank, so this would not change the current 
situation much.184 Under a two-state solution the desire for Palestine to be  
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economically self-sufficient is mandatory. Part of that self-sufficiency requires 
infrastructure development, which allows the free flow of goods and services 
around the country in the most expedient way possible.   
As part of a land swap, Israel should be required to pay for building a 
modern, efficient road system in the areas adjacent to the affected areas 
swapped.  It is reasonable that all Palestinian villages within a half-mile of the 
agreed-upon areas should be connected via a modern road system to prevent 
any isolation and to encourage development and goodwill. In addition, the roads 
must be under Palestinian control upon completion. Israel will certainly see this 
as a security threat, however, if Palestine is ever to be its own nation it will 
require the infrastructure to do so. The greater economic development and the 
more employment, the less violence from Palestinian territories against Israel will 
occur. Over time, it is in Israel’s security interest for Palestine to thrive 
economically.  
One of the biggest problems preventing a two-state solution are Israeli 
settlements. The Wye River agreement divided the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
into three separate areas. Area A (as depicted by red shaded areas on Figures 6 
and 7) was to be handed over to the Palestinians for both administrative control 
and security.185 Area B (as depicted by yellow shaded areas on Figures 6 and 7) 
was to be handed over to the Palestinians for administrative control and security 
was to be conducted jointly.186 Area C (as depicted as the rest of the area on 
Figures 6 and 7) was to remain under Israeli occupation, for both administrative 
and security control.187 Figure 7 shows the location of Israeli settlements in 
relation to the areas and types of control under the Wye River agreement and the 
land swap recommendation. East Jerusalem, indicated on the map, as 
contention area 1, is the most contentious, followed by Bethlehem, contention 
                                            
185  Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict: A History with Documents, 
448. 
186  Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 448. 
187  Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 448. 
 94
area 2, then Ramallah in the north as contention area 3, and finally, further south 
as contention area 4.  Each of these areas highlighted on the map shows where 
under previous agreements the Palestinians had either direct control or minimum 
administrative control, but the Israelis have built settlements.  All four of these 
areas have the strategic high ground and have religious significance. For East 
Jerusalem it boils down to control, both sides desiring Jerusalem for their capital. 
Maintaining the high ground around Jerusalem gives Israel the security 
advantage and direct control of the city.  
 
Figure 6.   Map 2, Security Zones188,189,190,191,192 
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Figure 7.   Map 3, Security Zones around Jerusalem193,194,195,196,197 
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It is likely that the Palestinian Authority could make an agreement that 
allows many of the current settlements to fall under Israel control.  However, it is 
important to note that many of the settlements can affect security and control 
beyond their boundaries. Whenever the borders are firmly established, any 
incidents of border violation, such as shooting across the border, must be 
adjudicated.  Both sides must be willing to deal with these types of incidents 
within the confines of the rule-of-law. Maintaining the rule-of-law, as it relates to 
border issues and holding each society accountable for its actions, will serve to 
maintain the peace agreement.  Without this assurance, the citizens on both 
sides will demand action by their government to guarantee their safety.  With 
both sides living in close proximity to each other, there will be continued 
confrontations even after any peace agreement, and both sides must take steps 
ahead of time to deal with situations accordingly. 
One of Israel’s demands to deal with security is for a demilitarized 
Palestine.198 A similar approach worked in Northern Ireland. As part of the peace 
agreement in Northern Ireland, there was a period of “decommissioning.”  
Various factions were to turn in their weapons as signs of good faith for moving 
towards peace.199 A similar process needs to take place in Palestine.  This 
process will tackle two key problems. First, by forcing Palestinians to give up 
their individual weapons, Israeli security concerns can start to be addressed, 
making it more likely for Israel to continue to pursue peace. Second, by forcing 
Palestinians to give up their arms, there will be less competition for control in the 
West Bank.  The Palestinian Authority needs to have the monopoly on security to 
ensure that the rule-of-law is enforced. If the governing authority is in control, 
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then there will be room for a Palestinian society to unite behind a peaceful 
administration. Any process of demilitarizing must also include Israeli settlers. 
They do have the right to self-defense; however, if individual Israeli settlers are 
allowed to remain armed while Palestinians are disarming, the agreement will fall 
apart.  As part of any border agreement, the security of Israeli settlements should 
be in the hands of Israeli security forces, not the settlers themselves.   
As part of the Oslo agreement, internal Palestinian security was 
addressed.  As shown in Figure 6, Palestinians were given areas for maintaining 
security. Palestinian security forces were armed and required to maintain the 
rule-of-law. As described in Chapter IV, Yasser Arafat created a convoluted and, 
at times, a counterproductive security force.  In 2000, at the start of the second 
intifada, these same forces were armed and engaged in fights with the Israeli 
military.  For there to be a two-state solution, Palestine must have a security 
force to police its own that has legislative oversight and civil society involvement. 
There will always exist the threat that these forces could be used as a vanguard 
against Israel.  To prevent this, the United States is conducting paramilitary 
training for the Palestinians in the hopes of creating a professional police force 
interested in protecting internal security loyal to the Palestinian Authority instead 
of personalities within the Palestinian government.  This program is necessary for 
the continued development of this force and to ensure that the rule-of-law is the 
focus of loyalty.  These forces also are being used to ensure the survivability of 
the Palestinian Authority in the face of Hamas’ challenge to their rule.  As long as 
Palestinian society is fractured along ideological lines, security forces will hold 
allegiances to personalities instead of the rule-of-law or a constitution.   
The Palestinian society as a whole needs to be pushed in a direction that 
holds loyalty to a constitution and provide checks and balances over its 
leadership.  Checks and balances are also crucial to the survivability of the 
Palestinian Authority. Speculation as to why Hamas achieved victory in the 2006 
elections is due to the rampant corruption of the officials within the Palestinian 
Authority.  An open government confined by checks and balances will provide the 
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necessary assurances to the Palestinian population and start to gain their trust. A 
security force that is bound by legislative rules with civil society involved in the 
process reinforces the system and builds trust between the people, the political 
leaders, and the security structure. It takes time for this type of system to develop 
but continued oversight, encouragement, and aid will assist Palestine to head in 
this direction.  Only when Palestinian citizens have a government that truly 
represents all of its citizens, is professional, not corrupt, and holds a monopoly of 
force, will Palestinians be able to work together to provide the security needs 
Israel demands and Palestinians deserve.  
B. WATER SECURITY 
Water in Israel and Palestine is a security issue. Control of water 
resources is a primary concern for Israeli involvement in the West Bank. 
According to Mark Zeitoun in his article “Avoiding a Mideast Water War,” 
Washington Post, 4 February 2004, “A critical natural resource that is both 
scarce and unfairly distributed is a catalyst for conflict.”200 Two thirds of all fresh 
water used comes from Palestinian territory.201 According to Marz De Villiers in 
his book Water: The fate of our most precious resource (1999), states that by 
2010, Israel will be running an annual water deficit of 360 million cubic meters, 
Jordan will be running a 200 million cubic meter deficit, and the West Bank will 
be at a deficit of 140 million cubic meters.202 This deficit translates into less water 
for each individual, the destruction of aquifers due to over pumping, and 
heightened tensions over control of the remaining water.  
The source for most surface water begins at the headwaters north of the 
Sea of Galilee supplying all the needs down the Jordan valley to the Dead Sea, 
the lowest point on dry ground in the world.  The Jordan River is geographically a 
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natural divide between countries and is a security concern for both Israel and 
Jordan. It cannot be overstated that one of the main reasons Israel occupies the 
Jordan rift valley is for control of the water in the Jordan River. The Mountain 
Aquifer (in the West Bank) provides one-forth of Israel’s water. “At present, Israel 
controls all the aquifers in the West Bank.”203 Highlighting the seriousness of the 
issue over control of the aquifers in the West Bank, in 1997 the Minister of 
Agriculture Refael Eitan stated on national radio “the country would be in mortal 
danger if it lost control of the Mountain Aquifer.”204 Control of the West Bank and 
location of settlements is not just about strategic defensible positions but also 
about what is under the West Bank. Aaron Wolf in his book Hydropolitics Along 
the Jordan River describes the calculations the Zionist movement considered 
when designing a homeland in Palestine. 
Economic security was defined by water resources. The entire 
Zionist programme of immigration and settlement required water for 
large-scale irrigation and, in a land with no fossil fuels, for 
hydropower.  The plans were “completely dependent” on the 
acquisition of “the headwaters of the Jordan, the Litani River, the 
snows of Hermon, the Yarmuk and its tributaries, and the 
Jabbok.205 
Without water, agriculture in both states would literally dry up and drag 
down the rest of the economy. Israel’s agriculture sector is about two to three 
percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) while the agriculture sector for 
Palestine is between 24 to 30 percent of Palestine’s GDP.206 Local access to 
water for farmers is critical to continued economic survivability and for peace and 
stability. Israel controls 80 percent of all aquifers in the West Bank and the 
average Israeli consumes 350 cubic meters of water per year while the average 
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Palestinian consumes 87 cubic meters a year.207 Because Palestinians have 
very little access to water and Palestinian villages are isolated by Israel security 
measures, they are forced to buy the water taken from the West Bank from the 
Israelis. “At a price between five to 15 times that charged by the Israeli 
government, there is always a settler willing to make the deal.”208 Control of 
water is directly tied into where the border should be placed as well as where 
Israel settlements are located. Lack of access to water will continue to fuel 
conflict between both sides or greater cooperation and access will help to 
alleviate security concerns. 
The flow of water in the West Bank flows into three drainage basins: north 
towards the Sea of Galilee, west towards the coastal plains, and east towards the 
Jordan River and dead sea, see Figure 8. The darker shaded areas on Figure 8 
are designated as critical regions in proximity to the green line for aquifer 
access.209  
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Figure 8.   Map 4, Water Resources210,211,212,213,214,215 
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Israeli settlements located within this area are strategically placed to 
control the Mountain Aquifer. Water is crucial not just for daily consumption but 
also for continued economic support of the agricultural sector.  Israel’s economy 
is diversified but holds a large agricultural sector that consumes most of the 
water diverted from the Jordan River. The Palestinian economy is almost 
completely agriculturally based with very little diversification. A key component to 
a two-state solution is the fair division of water resources. In 1998, “Palestinian 
wells could not exceed a depth of 140 meters, though Jewish wells could go 
down 800 meters.”216 In addition, the authorities “may search and confiscate any 
water resources for which no permit exists, even if the owner has not been 
convicted.”217 It is these types of policies and the location of Israeli settlements in 
key locations that allow Israel to maintain control of all water resources within 
Israeli and Palestinian territories. 
The coastal aquifer has been over-pumped and is in danger of seawater 
intrusion contaminating the drinking water beyond safe levels.218 Israel’s national 
water company is bringing a desalinization plant on line in 2011 that will provide 
an additional 100 million cubic meters of water a year, reducing their deficit to 
260 million cubic meters.219 The rate of consumption and demand will only get 
worse as population increases. 
The definition of borders relates directly to control of water sources. 
However, even if a border is agreed to, access to clean water is not limited to 
border constraints. Any establishment of a Palestinian state will require an 
agreement of access to water; limitations that allow water consumption, as well 
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as waste water management. Since the two-states are interconnected on this 
issue, proper management is required to ensure each side does not take 
advantage.  This thesis concludes based on geographic analysis that it is in the 
interest of both parties to have one unified water system over which both sides 
have control as well as a voice in future developments.   The argument that 
allowing Palestine to retain control of their water rights will result in contamination 
and over-pumping as espoused by Joshua Schwarz would be nullified in this type 
of an arrangement.220  By building a unified water distribution system under 
which Palestine would receive the infrastructure needed for economic 
development, the joint system would be able to monitor the health of the water 
supply more accurately, and neither side would be able to argue that the other is 
over-pumping and mismanaging its water resources.  
C. CONVENTIONAL THREATS 
Israel’s military is the most advanced in the region. In terms of force-on-
force engagements against Palestine, Israel dominates all three combat areas: 
land, sea, and air. Because of this dominance and Palestine’s lack of any 
conventional force, the conflict naturally developed into an insurgency/terrorist 
style.  Looking for inspiration, Yasser Arafat modeled the early Palestinian 
revolution after the Algeria revolution in the 60s.221 Israel more or less has 
freedom of movement to go where it wants and when it wants to in the 
Palestinian territories. An IPB with an overlay of this fact is not necessary. 
Israel’s military is geared to combat foreign militaries and is a factor for 
maintaining a large military, but in terms of peace with Palestine the conflict will 
come at the negotiating table when attempting to decide the size and capability 
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of forces.  Israel must maintain a large force due to external threats. Palestine 
will always see this force as a direct threat to their sovereignty. However, as long 
as Israel maintains a large army, Palestine will not need to fear any invasion by 
other neighbors.  Should the occasion arise for another Arab army to invade 
Palestine, Israel, out of self-defense will prevent this from happening.  This is an 
unlikely event but it does demonstrate the point that Palestine, as a nation, will 
be able to bandwagon in terms of security from external threats. This would allow 
Palestine to focus on internal security for policing its own citizens. 
Because Palestine does not have a conventional force it currently has only 
four real threats against Israel: rockets, manpads, suicide bombs, and 
Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs). One of the security concerns of a two-state 
solution is the introduction of Iranian-made rockets into the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip (see Figure 9). Iran has shown the intention of arming radical groups in the 
Palestinian territories. In January 2002, Israel intercepted a shipment of Iranian 
weapons bound for Palestine aboard the ship Karina A.222 The weapons 
shipment contained 122mm and 107mm Katyusha rockets with a range of 8 to 20 
kilometers.223 Israel is fearful that Iranian support in the Palestinian territories will 
be similar to support Iran has provided for Hezbollah in Lebanon.  In southern 
Lebanon resides a large Shi’ite population. Because of the permissive 
environment, proximity to Israel, and ideological similarities, Iran’s export of 
fundamentalism and terrorism to Lebanon makes sense. “In mid-1982, the 
Guards Corps' Muhammad Rasulullah brigade was dispatched to Lebanon. Two 
thousand Revolutionary Guards stayed in Lebanon when the brigade returned to 
Iran.”224 The purpose of the Guards Corps was to provide logistics, manning, and 
training, which resulted in the creation of the Hezbollah organization known as 
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the Party of God. “Iran and Syria share credit for sponsoring these 
revolutionaries, although Iran certainly played the leading role. For Iran, the 
creation of Hezbollah was a realization of the revolutionary state's zealous 
campaign to spread the message of the self-styled “Islamic revolution.”225 In 
2006, Israel fought a war with Hezbollah that started due to Hezbollah killing 
eight Israeli soldiers and kidnapping two.226 One of the objectives of the war was 
to eliminate Hezbollah’s stockpile of Iranian missiles.227  Because Iran’s foreign 
policy aims to destroy Israel it supplies Hezbollah with weapons and rockets. 
There exists a real security threat that Iran will also arm Palestinian militant 
groups in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip with rockets. Map 5 shows what that 
threat would look like. Forty-six miles south of the West Bank all the way to Eilat 
is the only place in Israel that would not be under direct threat should Iran be 
successful in importing rockets into the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
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Figure 9.   Map 5, Missile Threat228,229,230,231,232 
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The second threat to Israel from Palestinian territories as indicated on 
Figure 9 as a red line, is a shoulder-launched, man-portable surface-to-air missile 
(MANPAD). Manpads are plentiful around the world but do require specialized 
training. Currently there are no indications of the presence of these types of 
missiles in the West Bank, but there is a good possibility they are there or could 
quickly be moved there. Manpads are not a threat to the sovereignty of Israel but 
they do represent an air defense against Israel’s air dominance. If Palestine were 
able to militarily establish an air defense system, Israel’s ability to assert its 
security protocols would be severely limited. This is all hypothetical, but 
constitutes a very real threat if Palestine is given direct control of its borders with 
Jordan and if Palestine allows the import of these types of weapons. The 
distance on the map is based on an approximate range of 5,000 meters or about 
3 miles.  
The third and fourth threat are real threats but cannot be applied to a 
geographical analysis at this time as they are not limited to geography and are 
determined by the individual conducting the attack at the time and there are 
currently no trend data.  Hamas has a history of conducting suicide bombings, 
but has given up the practice, and it seems that this threat may have 
disappeared. But, given that there is a history of this tactic it cannot be ruled out 
for future use. Israel’s security wall seems to be an effective measure against this 
tactic (see Chapter II for discussion about the security wall).  The threat of IEDs 
is only speculative. There is no evidence of the use of IEDs being imported to 
Palestine; however, given that the technology and procedures were transferred 
from Iraq to Afghanistan it is a likely possibility of this occurring in Palestine. 
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For there to be a two-state solution, security for both sides is a 
requirement. The reason Oslo failed is because it got the process backwards. It 
attempted to bring both sides together through incremental steps and hope they 
would begin to trust each other and see each other as partners for peace. The 
assumption was that by building trust, some day, both sides would be able to sit 
down and negotiate the difficult issue of the final status (mutually recognized 
borders). To this end, confidence-building measures of joint security patrols, 
withdrawal of Israeli forces from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and lessening of 
Israeli control over the economic structures of Palestine were implemented. 
Agreements under Oslo were able to tackle some very difficult issues, but the 
final status always loomed on the horizon.   
Both sides approached the final status from different perspectives on 
where to start: Palestine believed the borders should be the 1948 UN mandate 
and Israel started with the 1967 armistice agreement. This difference in starting 
points led both sides to position their forces and posture in ways that would give 
greater influence in the final status negotiations.  Instead of working together, this 
approach had the unintended consequences of creating an environment of 
competitive positioning. By establishing policies in ways to give greater leverage, 
the true intentions on either side became questionable and untrustworthy. Since 
many of the issues preventing peace are connected with location of borders, 
when the final status was attempted the agreements under the incremental 
approach under Oslo became threatened and the whole process collapsed. 
Working towards an unknown outcome along with posturing by the Israelis 
increased the fears of Palestinians of never reaching an acceptable peace and 
contributed to the start of the second intifada. However, if the starting point (of 
defining borders) is also the end point, then between the agreement on borders 
and Palestine as an independent state, working on the individual issues can 
succeed where the Oslo process failed.  
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Defining the borders at the beginning of the process provides a common 
perspective of how the end results will look. This will allow for freedom to act 
within the confines of the end result. If Palestine knows what territory will be 
theirs in the end, then fears of Israeli settlement expansion are alleviated 
because any settlements agreed to would be on Israeli territory and free to 
expand to the border.  This assumes that through the border negotiations, both 
sides are willing to compromise on the precise location of the border. Instead of 
working their way toward a final status, they should start with the final status and 
work their way backwards.  This will be difficult, but by defining the borders first, 
both sides will be working towards a concrete end state instead of a nebulous 
moving end state. 
Based on the IPB, security recommendations are to first define a border 
that both sides recognize and are internationally accepted. This prevents either 
side from expanding beyond their agreement and prevents miscommunication 
about intentions and desires.  By defining borders, Israeli settlements are free to 
expand within the confines of the borders and the Palestinians will be able to rely 
on international oversight to guarantee the borders are maintained. Real 
consequences must be applied to violation by either side, if they do not maintain 
the borders agreed to.  Such consequences can come in the form of aid being 
cut.  If this is applied, the United States Senate must build it into the law that is 
outside the control of a vote.  In other words, Israel and Palestine will continue to 
receive the aid specified so long as they maintain the borders, but if any violation 
occurs, the aid will be automatically stopped until such time as the violation is 
resolved.  Restoration of aid should rest in the hands of the President, not 
congress. 
Secondly, both Palestinians and Israeli settlers must be disarmed.  
Palestinian security must be in the hands of a professional Palestinian security 
force. Israeli settlers potentially represent a challenge to their ability to provide 
security for their citizens.  In addition, by both sides laying down arms and 
leaving security to the security forces, both sides are signaling a desire for 
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peace. This measure has a chance to create an environment that will allow the 
rule-of-law under the Palestinian Authority to assert its authority.  The Palestinian 
Authority needs the time and space to gain the confidence of its own citizens 
through the protection of their individual rights. 
Thirdly, a third nation must maintain the border between Palestine and 
Jordan. Palestine’s economy is tied directly to Israel and has not been allowed to 
develop independently.  For Palestine to develop economically, it needs the 
opportunity to engage the international market outside the control of Israel.  
Opening up Palestinian markets will allow the potential for Iranian weapons flow 
into the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  The analysis from this IPB suggests that 
there needs to be a time when a third nation acts as the conduit between 
Palestine and the world markets to ensure the continued security of Israel while 
allowing the development of Palestine. If there is a third nation along the Jordan 
rift valley, Israel’s strategic calculations will change and they will no longer need 
to maintain a presence in the West Bank. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Security for a two-state solution requires compromise and a clear 
definition of borders. It is only with the designation of borders between Israel and 
Palestine that a Palestinian identity can transition to one of nationalism instead of 
revolution and opposition. A clear boundary means greater security for Israel in 
the form of fewer requirements for policing a population that it has no desire to 
police. In addition, Israeli presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is an 
inflammatory against peace. With an Israeli withdrawal, the Palestinian 
population is less likely to be incensed against Israel. By defining and providing 
international recognition of the borders at the beginning of a peace process, both 
sides will be on equal footing and working towards the same goal, instead of 
trying to work the peace process to get the best conditions for a final solution. It 
was this condition that lead to Oslo’s failure. By not designating the borders in 
the beginning of the process, both sides manipulated the process in the hopes of 
getting the best outcome. This approach worked against the process of 
confidence-building measures and led to the collapse of Oslo. Alternatively, by 
agreeing to set borders, the issue of Israeli settlements will disappear because 
they will either be incorporated into Israeli territory and no longer a territorial 
concern for Palestine, or they will be given to Palestine for control. Israeli 
settlements that remain within Palestinian territory surrounded on all sides works 
against the security conditions necessary for peace.   
By the end of the process, the settlements that do not have direct 
attachment to Israeli territory through redefining of borders should either be given 
over to Palestine or removed.  In addition, the refugee right of return will also 
disappear, as there will be a Palestinian state established to incorporate the 
refugees back into Palestinian society.  Compromising on the borders first 
through land swaps will allow these necessary compromises to become part of 
the equation, and then confidence-building measures have a greater chance of 
success.   
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Currently, Israel’s policy on negotiations is Security First. It believes that 
granting Palestine greater autonomy will compromise Israel’s security and lead to 
greater violence. While it is true that certain elements of society will take 
advantage of more relaxed restrictions as a way to import weapons, if Palestine 
is given the ability to develop its economy and provide jobs to its population, 
greater economic prosperity is likely to lead to a population that will demand 
peace instead of returning to a time of no hope or living in poverty.  
“Palestinians must believe that they will have a sovereign, contiguous, and 
economically viable state that will be free from continued Israeli controls and 
forcible interventions.”233 It is only when Palestine is on even footing with Israel in 
providing security for its citizens and its neighbors as well as in developing an 
economy that provides hope for a future to its citizens that peace will be viable. 
Palestinians must have hope in a better future for themselves and their children 
for them to trust in any agreements made with Israel.  If Palestinians believe they 
will have a greater future with peace than a life of uncertainty and poverty, then 
the Palestinian population will demand peace and protect it from the radical 
elements from within its own society.  
The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace analysis showed that the 
greatest threat exists from external elements providing weapons to radical 
elements within the Palestinian population. If the Palestinian borders are opened 
to Arab neighbors without security guarantees, it is likely that violence will erupt. 
To combat this from happening, an option is stationing a third nation security 
force along the border to act as the border security force, protecting the peace 
and ensuring that the free flow of goods is not compromised by illegal weapons.  
This third nation security force could be the security guarantee that Israel needs 
in order to withdraw from the West Bank and protect its citizens.  This type of 
arrangement has worked well along the Israeli–Egyptian border.  This third nation  
 
                                            
233  J.D. Crouch II et al., Security First, 1. 
 113
force should not provide the internal security for Palestine, as any force 
attempting to provide security will become the target of dissidents and be drawn 
into conflict rather than policing and stability operations.  
The key to lasting peace will be the development of a Palestinian 
economy that is capable of competing on the world market and increasing the 
standard of living in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The imbalance between 
Israel and Palestine is too great for there to be an equal distribution of wealth and 
resources. Palestine simply is not able to compete with Israel and must be given 
a chance to develop independently. With few exceptions, the two economies 
should be separated and autonomy given to Palestine free from influence and 
oversight from Israel.  When the two economies are more balanced and similar in 
nature, then Stephen Brooks’ idea of integrated economies through regional 
trade agreements and multinational corporations will work to provide the 
economic ties to security cooperation. While this thesis concludes that the 
economies should be divided for a period of time, the water infrastructure, 
management, and oversight should be connected. Water drives the economy, 
and if mismanaged or polluted by one partner, it affects the other.  Neither should 
one partner be give complete authority over the resources, creating an imbalance 
in distribution.  A joint approach to this problem ensures the prevention of over 
pumping, providing the best quality of product to both peoples and helping to 
grow the economy.  In addition, by being connected through this public utility, at 
a later time, when the Palestinian economy is more fully developed, a 
reintegration through multinational corporations and regional trade agreements 
can better facilitate linking the two nations through peaceful means.  
A two-state solution is achievable by defining the borders with follow-on 
negotiations over the less contentious issues while direct oversight of 
measurable benchmarks is monitored by the United States.  The United States 
must be able to provide real incentives and penalties to facilitate the peace 
process while maintaining security for both Israel and Palestine. 
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